v0.26.5 minor doc update and code cleanup
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@@ -30,8 +30,7 @@ streams, or downstream LogWisp nodes.
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- [CLI](cli.md): flags, signals, exit codes, `lw auth`; also the `lw(1)`
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manual, [`lw.1`](lw.1)
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- [Operations](operations.md): running, monitoring, tuning, troubleshooting
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- [To Do](todo.md): planned work in priority order: packaging, smaller
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follow-ups
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- [To Do](todo.md): planned work: packaging
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A fully annotated configuration covering every option lives at
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[`config/logwisp.toml`](../config/logwisp.toml).
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+7
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@@ -446,7 +446,10 @@ A listener needs no certificate files. With `self_signed = true`, or with
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`issuer_cert_file` and `issuer_key_file`, it makes an ECDSA P-256 key once per
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process and, at startup and every reload, a certificate for it valid 397 days
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(never past the issuer), for `hosts`, its `host` (unless a wildcard),
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`os.Hostname()`, `localhost`, `127.0.0.1` and `::1`.
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`os.Hostname()`, `localhost`, `127.0.0.1` and `::1`. Every such listener of
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one process shares that key, self-signed or issued, so one pin matches them
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all; a dialer that must tell two apart verifies by name with `ca_file`, or
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the listeners use `cert_file`.
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- **Self-signed.** No CA can vouch for it, so dialers pin its key:
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`pin_sha256`, which the listener logs at WARN on every start. A reload
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@@ -461,8 +464,9 @@ process and, at startup and every reload, a certificate for it valid 397 days
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- **Pins.** A pin is the SHA-256 of the server's public key, not of its
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certificate, so it survives reissue. `pin_sha256` accepts several, `;`
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between them, for a rotation. It replaces chain, name and validity checks:
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whoever holds the key is the server. `scram` dialers still bind every login
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to that certificate.
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whoever holds the key is the server. A pinned dialer never resumes a TLS
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session, so every connection checks the pins, and a pin a reload drops
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holds at once. `scram` dialers still bind every login to that certificate.
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```bash
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lw tls ca --dir /etc/logwisp/pki # ca.crt, ca.key (0600)
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-11
@@ -60,14 +60,3 @@ identity, and both skeletons download the tagged source.
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5. Shell completion for bash, zsh and fish, installed by `make install`.
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6. A packaging CI job: build the AUR package in an Arch container and the port
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in a FreeBSD VM, run `lw --version` and `make image-check`.
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## 2. Follow-ups
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Smaller items found along the way, each independent of the others.
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1. TLS: the generated-certificate key is one per process, so a pin taken from a
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`self_signed` listener also matches an `issuer` listener of the same
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process; document it or key per listener. Pins are checked in
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`VerifyPeerCertificate`, which Go skips on resumption: guard it if a dialer
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ever keeps a `ClientSessionCache`.
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2. `core.ShutdownTimeout` is unused.
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