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v0.17.0 mtls added to network chain, sinks, and sources

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lixen
2026-08-29 18:44:44 -04:00
parent b2e36be53f
commit 80e0017140
26 changed files with 2293 additions and 488 deletions
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internal/sink/http/http.go
+72 -18
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@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"maps"
"net"
"net/http"
"strconv"
@@ -14,6 +15,7 @@ import (
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"logwisp/internal/authz"
"logwisp/internal/config"
"logwisp/internal/core"
"logwisp/internal/plugin"
@@ -70,6 +72,9 @@ type HTTPSink struct {
// TLS
tlsConfig *tls.Config
// Authorization
auth *authz.Policy
// Runtime
done chan struct{}
stopOnce sync.Once
@@ -130,6 +135,10 @@ func NewHTTPSinkPlugin(
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
authPolicy, err := authz.New(opts.Auth, opts.TLS, authz.RoleListener)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
h := &HTTPSink{
id: id,
@@ -142,6 +151,7 @@ func NewHTTPSinkPlugin(
clients: make(map[uint64]*sseClient),
writeTimeout: time.Duration(opts.WriteTimeoutMS) * time.Millisecond,
tlsConfig: tlsCfg,
auth: authPolicy,
}
h.lastProcessed.Store(time.Time{})
@@ -153,7 +163,14 @@ func NewHTTPSinkPlugin(
"stream_path", opts.StreamPath,
"status_path", opts.StatusPath,
"tls", tlsCfg != nil,
"mtls", tlsCfg != nil && tlsCfg.ClientAuth == tls.RequireAndVerifyClientCert)
"mtls", tlsCfg != nil && tlsCfg.ClientAuth == tls.RequireAndVerifyClientCert,
"auth", authPolicy.Describe())
if authPolicy.Unrestricted() {
logger.Warn("msg", "Auth policy admits any identity the configured CA vouches for",
"component", "http_sink",
"instance_id", id,
"hint", "set auth.allow or auth.allow_patterns to authorize named clients")
}
return h, nil
}
@@ -162,9 +179,9 @@ func (h *HTTPSink) Capabilities() []core.Capability {
caps := []core.Capability{core.CapSessionAware, core.CapMultiSession}
if h.tlsConfig != nil {
caps = append(caps, core.CapTLS)
if h.tlsConfig.ClientAuth == tls.RequireAndVerifyClientCert {
caps = append(caps, core.CapAuth) // mTLS is authentication
}
}
if h.auth.Enabled() {
caps = append(caps, core.CapAuth) // authorizes clients, not just the CA
}
return caps
}
@@ -189,9 +206,12 @@ func (h *HTTPSink) Start(ctx context.Context) error {
mux.HandleFunc(http.MethodGet+" "+h.config.StreamPath, h.handleStream)
mux.HandleFunc(http.MethodGet+" "+h.config.StatusPath, h.handleStatus)
// Auth extension point: wrap mux with auth middleware once credentials
// land, e.g. handler = authMiddleware(cfg)(handler)
// One wrapper covers stream and status, and keeps the handlers themselves
// unaware of authorization
var handler http.Handler = mux
if h.auth.Enabled() {
handler = h.authMiddleware(handler)
}
h.server = &http.Server{
Handler: handler,
@@ -343,6 +363,9 @@ func (h *HTTPSink) handleStream(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
meta["tls_peer_cn"] = cn
}
}
// Set by authMiddleware; absent when auth is disabled
ident, _ := r.Context().Value(identityKey{}).(authz.Identity)
ident.Apply(meta)
sess := h.proxy.CreateSession(remote, meta)
c := &sseClient{
@@ -361,6 +384,7 @@ func (h *HTTPSink) handleStream(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
"remote_addr", remote,
"session_id", sess.ID,
"client_id", id,
"auth_identity", ident.Name,
"active_clients", count)
defer func() {
@@ -432,6 +456,7 @@ func (h *HTTPSink) handleStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
"host": h.config.Host,
"port": h.config.Port,
"tls": h.tlsConfig != nil,
"auth": h.auth.Describe(),
"active_clients": h.activeClients.Load(),
"buffer_size": h.config.BufferSize,
"uptime_seconds": int(time.Since(h.startTime).Seconds()),
@@ -444,6 +469,7 @@ func (h *HTTPSink) handleStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
"total_processed": h.totalProcessed.Load(),
"dropped_writes": h.droppedWrites.Load(),
"rejected_clients": h.rejectedClients.Load(),
"auth_rejected": h.auth.Rejected(),
},
}
@@ -454,6 +480,20 @@ func (h *HTTPSink) handleStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// GetStats returns sink statistics
func (h *HTTPSink) GetStats() sink.SinkStats {
lastProc, _ := h.lastProcessed.Load().(time.Time)
details := map[string]any{
"host": h.config.Host,
"port": h.config.Port,
"buffer_size": h.config.BufferSize,
"tls": h.tlsConfig != nil,
"dropped_writes": h.droppedWrites.Load(),
"rejected_clients": h.rejectedClients.Load(),
"endpoints": map[string]string{
"stream": h.config.StreamPath,
"status": h.config.StatusPath,
},
}
maps.Copy(details, h.auth.Stats())
return sink.SinkStats{
ID: h.id,
Type: "http",
@@ -461,21 +501,35 @@ func (h *HTTPSink) GetStats() sink.SinkStats {
ActiveConnections: h.activeClients.Load(),
StartTime: h.startTime,
LastProcessed: lastProc,
Details: map[string]any{
"host": h.config.Host,
"port": h.config.Port,
"buffer_size": h.config.BufferSize,
"tls": h.tlsConfig != nil,
"dropped_writes": h.droppedWrites.Load(),
"rejected_clients": h.rejectedClients.Load(),
"endpoints": map[string]string{
"stream": h.config.StreamPath,
"status": h.config.StatusPath,
},
},
Details: details,
}
}
// identityKey carries the authorized identity from the middleware to the
// handlers; absent when auth is disabled
type identityKey struct{}
// authMiddleware gates every endpoint on the client certificate policy.
// The rejection carries no detail: the status endpoint already exposes host,
// port, and throughput counters, so a 403 should not add the shape of the
// policy on top of that.
func (h *HTTPSink) authMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ident, err := h.auth.Authorize(r.TLS)
if err != nil {
h.logger.Warn("msg", "Request rejected by auth policy",
"component", "http_sink",
"instance_id", h.id,
"remote_addr", r.RemoteAddr,
"path", r.URL.Path,
"error", err)
http.Error(w, "forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(context.WithValue(r.Context(), identityKey{}, ident)))
})
}
// writeSSE frames a payload per the W3C SSE spec (multi-line safe)
func writeSSE(w http.ResponseWriter, payload []byte) error {
for _, line := range splitLines(payload) {