v0.20.0 mtls hardening, fail-closed config, startup warnings, sink fixes

AGENTS.md

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+# Working rules
+
+It is the contract, not a suggestion.
+
+## Comments
+
+- A comment block is **at most 5 lines**. If the explanation needs more, the code
+  is wrong or the explanation belongs in `doc/`.
+- One line is the default. Comment *why*, never *what* — the code says what.
+- No narrative, no history ("this used to…", "the plan proposed…"), no restating
+  the diff, no essays on design philosophy. Git log and `doc/` hold those.
+- No comment on a self-evident function. `// Lookup returns the address` above
+  `func Lookup` is noise.
+- Package doc blocks: 5 lines. Files do not get their own prologue.
+
+## Files
+
+- Do not create a file for one or a few helpers. Put them next to what uses them,
+  or, if shared, in the package's main or type file.
+- A new file needs a new concept, not a new function.
+- Prefer editing an existing file over adding one.
+- When you edit a file, bring its comments up to these rules; older files predate
+  them.
+
+## Scope
+
+- Implement what was asked. Do not add tables, indirection, telemetry, tests or
+  abstraction that nothing asked for.
+  Exception: a task that explicitly invites additions gets the obvious ones, each
+  named in the PR body; ask before any that is not obvious.
+- One mechanism per problem. Two mechanisms doing one job is a bug or a refactor
+  opportunity.
+- Delete before adding. If a change is net-positive lines for a fix, justify it.
+- Reverting an existing API to "improve" it is not a fix. Leave working code alone.
+- Per-kind data lives in one table indexed by its kind; a new kind adds a row,
+  never a switch or a parallel field.
+
+## Tests
+
+- One test per rule, named for the rule. No test that restates another.
+- Test comments follow the 5-line limit.
+- Do not pin lists that a human has to hand-maintain unless the pin prevents a
+  real regression.
+- Collapse tests: when a broader test covers a narrower one, delete the narrower
+  one or do not add it. No test for simple behaviour that is unlikely to fail or
+  is already exercised elsewhere.
+
+## Docs and commits
+
+- `doc/` is already long. Condense when you touch it; append only for a new concept
+  or scope.
+- A gap you are deferring goes in the "Not Implemented" list of the design doc it
+  belongs to: extend the item, or add a concise one in the list's pattern.
+- The repository describes the architecture, never a machine: docs and commands
+  use placeholders for addresses, node names and credentials.
+- PR bodies: what changed, why, how it was verified.
+- One task, one branch, one PR. Divide the work into commits on that branch; do not
+  split it across stacked PRs or multiple branches.
+- Work that continues after its PR merged starts again from the latest main; never
+  stack new commits on merged history.
+
+## Gates
+
+`go build ./...`, `gofmt -l` on changed files, and `go test` on the packages the
+change touches.
+- A change to platform-sensitive code also cross-builds the production target:
+  `GOOS=freebsd GOARCH=amd64 go build ./cmd/logwisp`.
+- Do not run `-race` tests unless investigating a known/suspected race issue; CI
+  runs them.
+
+## LogWisp
+
+- Plugin options decode through `config.Scan`, never `lconfig.ScanMap`: unknown
+  keys must fail at any depth. Set defaults on the options struct before the
+  call; `TestEveryPluginRejectsUnknownKeys` covers every registered plugin.
+- Network security has two seams: `tlsx` (TLS configs, startup warnings) and
+  `authz` (every admission decision). Both return nil when disabled and every
+  method tolerates a nil receiver; keep call sites branch-free on config.
+- A plugin starts goroutines in `Start`, never in its constructor: a rejected
+  reload discards constructed plugins without calling `Stop`. Reload is the only
+  rotation path for certificates and secrets.
+- The chain `Hello` is the protocol's extension point: optional fields only (old
+  peers ignore unknown JSON); anything a peer must understand bumps
+  `chain.ProtocolVersion`.
+- Listeners and dialers are IPv4-only (`tcp4`). E2E scripts in `test/` need
+  `bin/logwisp` and `--auto`, and each owns a port range and a gitignored run
+  directory.
+- Many older files lack a trailing newline and fail `gofmt -l`; format the files
+  you change, not the tree.

README.md

@@ -64,11 +64,13 @@ exponential backoff and jitter.
   stream and status endpoints, and lets a dialer pin the server it talks to
 - Node binding: a chain source can label entries from the sender's certificate
   instead of from what the sender claims, so origin attribution is not forgeable
+- Fail-closed configuration: unknown keys are rejected, and startup warns about
+  expiring certificates, disabled verification and unanchored allow patterns
 
 See [Security](doc/security.md) for configuration and the exact boundary, and
 the [mTLS authentication design](doc/mtls-auth-plan.md) for the rationale and
-what is deliberately left out. Password, token, and SCRAM authentication were
+what is deliberately left out. Password authentication (Argon2id-SCRAM) is
-removed during the restructure and are not currently available.
+planned; see the [SCRAM design](doc/scram-auth-plan.md).
 
 ## Documentation
 
@@ -85,6 +87,7 @@ removed during the restructure and are not currently available.
 | [Networking](doc/networking.md) | Listeners, dialers, timeouts, connection limits |
 | [Security](doc/security.md) | TLS, mTLS, and peer authorization; threat model and current limits |
 | [mTLS Authentication](doc/mtls-auth-plan.md) | Design and rationale for certificate-based authorization |
+| [Password Authentication](doc/scram-auth-plan.md) | Planned Argon2id-SCRAM design; mTLS hardening |
 | [CLI](doc/cli.md) | Flags, signals, exit codes |
 | [Operations](doc/operations.md) | Running, monitoring, tuning, troubleshooting |
 

cmd/logwisp/reload_test.go

@@ -3,8 +3,12 @@ package main
 import (
 	"context"
 	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
 	"testing"
+	"time"
 
+	"logwisp/internal/plugin"
+	"logwisp/internal/session"
 	"logwisp/internal/testutil"
 
 	lconfig "github.com/lixenwraith/config"
@@ -77,3 +81,28 @@ func TestInvalidReloadLeavesStatusReporterRunning(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+// Every registered plugin decodes through the checked decoder, so a typo in
+// any plugin's config, security tables included, refuses to start.
+func TestEveryPluginRejectsUnknownKeys(t *testing.T) {
+	testLogger(t)
+	manager := session.NewManager(time.Hour)
+	t.Cleanup(manager.Stop)
+	proxy := session.NewProxy(manager, "typo")
+	bad := map[string]any{"no_such_key": true}
+	check := func(kind, name string, err error) {
+		if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "no_such_key") {
+			t.Errorf("%s %q accepted an unknown key: %v", kind, name, err)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, name := range plugin.ListSources() {
+		factory, _ := plugin.GetSource(name)
+		_, err := factory("typo", bad, logger, proxy)
+		check("source", name, err)
+	}
+	for _, name := range plugin.ListSinks() {
+		factory, _ := plugin.GetSink(name)
+		_, err := factory("typo", bad, logger, proxy)
+		check("sink", name, err)
+	}
+}

config/logwisp.toml

@@ -6,11 +6,12 @@
 ### Commented values are the built-in defaults unless marked "example".
 ### Uncommenting a default is a no-op.
 ###
-### NOTE: password/token/SCRAM authentication, network access control (ACL),
+### NOTE: password authentication (planned: doc/scram-auth-plan.md), network
-### http/tcp ingest sources, and http_client/tcp_client sinks were removed in
+### access control (ACL), http/tcp ingest sources, and http_client/tcp_client
-### the restructure and are not available in this version. TLS and mTLS ARE
+### sinks are not available in this version. TLS and mTLS ARE available on
-### available on every network source and sink; see the [...tls] blocks below,
+### every network source and sink; see the [...tls] blocks below, and the
-### and the [...auth] blocks to authorize peers by certificate identity.
+### [...auth] blocks to authorize peers by certificate identity.
+### Unknown keys in any plugin config are rejected at startup.
 ###
 ### Environment overrides use the LOGWISP_ prefix
 ### (LOGWISP_QUIET, LOGWISP_LOGGING_LEVEL, ...). Bare names are ignored.

doc/README.md

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ streams, or downstream LogWisp nodes.
 | [Networking](networking.md) | Listeners, dialers, timeouts, connection limits |
 | [Security](security.md) | TLS, mTLS, and peer authorization; threat model and current limits |
 | [mTLS Authentication](mtls-auth-plan.md) | Design and rationale for certificate-based authorization |
+| [Password Authentication](scram-auth-plan.md) | Planned Argon2id-SCRAM design; mTLS hardening |
 | [CLI](cli.md) | Flags, signals, exit codes |
 | [Operations](operations.md) | Running, monitoring, tuning, troubleshooting |
 

doc/configuration.md

@@ -241,7 +241,9 @@ Startup validation is intentionally split.
 Everything else is validated by the plugin constructor that owns it — port
 range, required paths, path prefixes, enum values, regex compilation, TLS file
 loading. A failure there aborts pipeline construction with a message naming the
-pipeline, plugin id, and offending key.
+pipeline, plugin id, and offending key. A key the plugin does not declare, at
+any depth, is such a failure (`unknown key "tls.enabeld"`): a misspelled option
+must not silently fall back to its default.
 
 There is **no** cross-pipeline port-conflict detection. Two sinks bound to the
 same port fail at listener bind time, when the pipeline starts.

doc/mtls-auth-plan.md

@@ -48,10 +48,10 @@ back to authenticated peers.
 
 ## Non-Goals
 
-- Reviving password, token, or SCRAM authentication. The reserved hooks
+- Password authentication. It is designed separately in
-  (`chain.Hello.Auth`, the `Authorization` header comment in the `http_chain`
+  [scram-auth-plan.md](scram-auth-plan.md), reusing the `auth` block and the
-  sink, the "Future: password auth block" comments in the network options
+  reserved hooks (`chain.Hello`, the `Authorization` header in the `http_chain`
-  structs) stay reserved.
+  sink, the "Future: password auth block" comments in the options structs).
 - IP allow/deny lists and per-peer rate limits. Related, but a separate feature
   with its own config surface.
 - OCSP. See [Revocation](#revocation) for what is done instead.
@@ -341,16 +341,13 @@ The remaining phase-4 items, in rough order of value:
    operators with existing CRL infrastructure. The allow-list covers the same
    ground with fewer moving parts, so this is only worth doing for a fleet whose
    revocation already flows through a CRL.
-2. **Certificate expiry warnings** at startup and on reload — a leaf expiring
+2. **Per-identity rate limits.** The natural follow-on now that identity exists,
-   inside 30 days logged at WARN. Nothing warns today; expiry shows up as a
-   handshake failure.
-3. **Per-identity rate limits.** The natural follow-on now that identity exists,
    and the natural home for the per-IP limiting that was also removed. Kept out
    of scope here so this feature stayed reviewable.
-4. **Per-client identity in the `http` sink's status output.** The endpoint
+3. **Per-client identity in the `http` sink's status output.** The endpoint
    reports the policy and counters, but not which identities are currently
    connected; session metadata has the data.
-5. **A list of `identity` modes** (try `san_uri`, fall back to `cn`) for
+4. **A list of `identity` modes** (try `san_uri`, fall back to `cn`) for
    heterogeneous PKI. A single mode is simpler and covers a uniform CA.
 
 ## Decisions Taken

doc/networking.md

@@ -140,7 +140,8 @@ retry. Browsers reconnect SSE streams automatically.
 TLS is enabled. Only `GET` is routed to the stream and status paths. Each event
 is framed as one `data:` line per newline in the payload, so multi-line entries
 stream intact. Response headers set `Cache-Control: no-cache`,
-`X-Accel-Buffering: no`, and `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`.
+`X-Accel-Buffering: no`, and, without an auth policy,
+`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`.
 
 **TCP sink** — raw payload bytes, no framing added by the sink. Whether entries
 are newline-delimited depends on the formatter.
@@ -150,6 +151,11 @@ headers, and entry encoding.
 
 ## Troubleshooting
 
+**Plugin fails to start with `unknown key "..."`**
+- The key is misspelled or belongs to another plugin type. Every plugin rejects
+  keys it does not declare, nested tables included, so a typo in `tls` or `auth`
+  cannot leave a protection silently off.
+
 **Connection refused**
 - Confirm the pipeline started; a bind failure is logged at ERROR.
 - Confirm you are dialing IPv4. `localhost` may resolve to `::1`.

doc/operations.md

@@ -281,7 +281,8 @@ openssl x509 -in /etc/logwisp/tls/relay.crt -noout -enddate
 ```
 
 Certificates load at plugin construction, so rotation is: write the new files,
-then `kill -HUP`. Automate the expiry check; nothing in LogWisp warns you.
+then `kill -HUP`. Startup and every reload warn at WARN once a certificate is
+within 30 days of expiry; automate the check anyway.
 
 **Access review**
 

doc/scram-auth-plan.md

@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+# Password Authentication (Argon2id-SCRAM)
+
+**Status:** planned. Ships in two batches:
+
+1. **Done:** `lixenwraith/auth` gained SCRAM channel binding, and the mTLS layer
+   was hardened (see [mTLS Hardening](#mtls-hardening)).
+2. **Next:** the SCRAM integration described here, pinned to the tagged `auth`
+   release that carries channel binding.
+
+**Scope:** optional username/password authentication on every network plugin,
+next to the existing certificate method, without weakening what mTLS gives.
+
+## Goals
+
+- Password authentication for chain links (`tcp_chain`, `http_chain`: sources
+  verify, sinks present) and for viewers of the `tcp` and `http` sinks.
+- No password or password-equivalent on the wire, no KDF work on listeners, and
+  no credential relay through a TLS-terminating MITM.
+- Default stays `auth.type = "none"`; existing configurations are unaffected.
+- Config in TOML, credential management and viewer clients in a `logwisp auth`
+  CLI.
+
+## Non-Goals
+
+- Standard SASL SCRAM-SHA-256 interoperability. The `auth` exchange is
+  logwisp-to-logwisp (or logwisp CLI) only.
+- Browser `EventSource` viewers under SCRAM: they cannot set `Authorization` or
+  run Argon2. mTLS remains the browser path.
+- Multiple backends behind a non-sticky L7 balancer: handshake state and the
+  token key live in one process.
+
+## Mechanism
+
+`lixenwraith/auth` Argon2id-SCRAM. The listener stores a verifier per user:
+`StoredKey = SHA-256(HMAC(K, "Client Key"))`, `ServerKey = HMAC(K, "Server Key")`,
+`K = Argon2id(password, salt)`. The Argon2id digest itself is never stored: it is
+the salted password, from which both keys derive. Verifying a proof is HMAC only;
+Argon2 runs on the dialer or CLI (64 MiB, t=3, the `auth` defaults).
+
+**Channel binding.** Both peers pass `auth.WithChannelBinding(SHA-256(server leaf
+DER))` at the proof step. The server hashes its configured certificate; the
+client hashes the certificate it saw. A relay presenting any other certificate,
+even one the CA trusts, makes the server reject the proof, so it never obtains a
+link or a token. A mismatch is indistinguishable from a wrong password by design;
+the client also sends its hash as a diagnostic field so the listener can log
+"TLS interception or terminating proxy" and count it. TLS must terminate at
+logwisp.
+
+**HTTP pinning.** HTTP auth takes two requests and every later request may use a
+new pooled connection, so binding the exchange is not enough. After step 1 the
+dialer pins the bound hash on its `VerifyConnection`: step 2 and every ingest
+request must present the same leaf. A mismatch clears token and pin and
+re-authenticates, which also covers certificate rotation. A token handed to curl
+by the CLI is unpinned.
+
+## Configuration
+
+```toml
+# listener (tcp_chain/http_chain source, tcp/http sink)
+[pipelines.plugin_sources.config.auth]
+type              = "scram"
+credentials_file  = "/etc/logwisp/users.toml"
+token_lifetime_ms = 900000          # http sink and http_chain source only
+node_binding      = "force"         # chain sources; binds to the username
+
+# dialer (tcp_chain/http_chain sink)
+[pipelines.plugin_sinks.config.auth]
+type          = "scram"
+username      = "edge-01"
+password_file = "/etc/logwisp/edge-01.pass"
+```
+
+Validation at construction:
+
+- `scram` requires TLS; a dialer also forbids `insecure_skip_verify`.
+- Listeners require `credentials_file` and reject `allow`/`allow_patterns`: the
+  credentials file is the allow list. Use one file per listener when listeners
+  admit different users.
+- Dialers require `username` + `password_file`, and reject `credentials_file`,
+  `allow*` and `identity` (server pinning stays an mTLS feature).
+- `identity` on a listener requires `tls.client_auth` and **binds the certificate
+  to the user**: the certificate's identity field must equal the SCRAM username,
+  so a peer needs its own certificate and its own password (PostgreSQL's
+  `clientcert=verify-full`). Without it the factors are independent: any
+  CA-issued certificate plus any valid password (`clientcert=verify-ca`).
+- `token_lifetime_ms` only on HTTP listeners; default 15 minutes.
+- `/auth` is reserved; no configured path may equal it.
+
+**Credentials file** (TOML, written by the CLI, mode 0600):
+
+```toml
+decoy_key = "<base64, 32 random bytes>"
+[[users]]
+username = "edge-01"
+salt = "<base64>"
+argon_time = 3
+argon_memory = 65536
+argon_threads = 4
+stored_key = "<base64>"
+server_key = "<base64>"
+```
+
+`decoy_key` keeps unknown-user challenges stable across restarts and edits, so
+probing usernames reveals nothing. It is created by the first `add-user` and
+preserved by every rewrite. An empty user set, a duplicate user, a missing
+`decoy_key` or mixed KDF profiles are configuration errors. The file is read at
+construction; the SCRAM server starts in the plugin's `Start` and stops in `Stop`,
+so a rejected reload leaks nothing.
+
+## Wire Protocol
+
+`chain.Hello` gains `scram` (raw JSON, decoded by `authz`); the protocol version
+stays 1 because the field is additive. Every message after the hello is one
+`authStep`: `error`, `challenge`, `proof` (+ `binding`), `final` (+ `token`,
+`expires_in` on HTTP). Pre-auth lines are capped at 4 KiB.
+
+**TCP** (`tcp_chain`, `tcp` sink): hello carrying the client-first message,
+challenge, proof, final — all under one deadline (`hello_timeout_ms` on the
+`tcp_chain` source, 10 s on the `tcp` sink and every dialer, with the dialer's
+context able to cut it short). The final is written only after every admission
+check (certificate binding, node binding); the stream then continues on the same
+buffered reader. A source without SCRAM answers a hello carrying credentials with
+`error: authentication not enabled`; only an old binary stays silent, and the
+dialer's deadline covers that.
+
+**HTTP** (`http_chain` source, `http` sink): `POST /auth`, outside the auth
+middleware, with its own 10 s read/write deadline and a 4 KiB body limit.
+
+| Step | Request body | Success | Failure |
+|------|--------------|---------|---------|
+| 1 | hello | `200` challenge | `429` throttled, `503` handshake table full, `400` malformed |
+| 2 | proof | `200` final, token, expires_in | `401 {"error":"authentication failed"}` |
+
+Protected endpoints take `Authorization: Bearer <token>`: missing or invalid is
+`401` with `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="logwisp"`, a certificate-binding miss
+is `403`. Tokens are HS256 JWTs from `auth.NewJWT` with a random per-instance key,
+so every reload revokes them. An SSE stream is checked at connect and outlives its
+token; a reload ends it.
+
+**Dialer outcomes** (`http_chain` sink): every `/auth` failure is transient (the
+batch is held under backoff); `404`/`405` from `/auth` logs "no auth endpoint:
+older logwisp or auth.type is not scram"; an ingest `401` clears the token and is
+retried; `403` drops the batch; a pin mismatch clears token and pin. Rejections
+are logged at WARN once per change of state and counted in `auth_failures` /
+`last_auth_error`.
+
+## Throttling
+
+Per remote IP (the socket address, never a forwarded header), on handshake
+starts: a token bucket (burst 10, 1/s) refunded on success, and at most 4
+unfinished exchanges. The table is bounded and fails closed when full. Abandoned
+TCP exchanges release their slot in the `auth` handshake table immediately.
+Counters: `auth_allowed` and `auth_rejected` once per exchange outcome;
+`auth_throttled`, `auth_busy` and `auth_binding_mismatch` separately.
+
+## The `authz` Seam
+
+Listeners never call `Authorize` directly any more; one entry point per transport
+decides, and `Authorize` itself refuses under `scram` so a missed call site fails
+closed.
+
+- `Admit(conn, cs, wantHello, timeout)` returns an admission (identity, hello,
+  reader) whose `Accept` or `Reject` writes the final message.
+- `AuthorizeRequest(r)` covers mTLS certificates and bearer tokens;
+  `ServeAuth(w, r)` serves `/auth`.
+- Dialers: `Greet(ctx, conn, node)` writes the hello (plain or SCRAM);
+  `Authenticate`, `SetAuthorization`, `ClearToken` and `VerifyConnection` serve
+  HTTP.
+- `Start`/`Close` bracket the SCRAM server and are nil-safe like everything else.
+
+## CLI
+
+```
+logwisp auth add-user    -credentials F -user U [-password-file P] [-generate]
+logwisp auth remove-user -credentials F -user U
+logwisp auth token  -url https://host:port -user U -password-file P [TLS flags]
+logwisp auth stream -addr host:port        -user U -password-file P [TLS flags]
+```
+
+- `add-user` takes the password from `-password-file` when it exists; a new user
+  without one gets a generated 130-bit password, written to that file (0600) or
+  printed once. Rotating an existing user needs the file or `-generate`, so a
+  mistyped path cannot replace a password. The file's KDF profile and decoy key
+  are reused, the result is validated with the daemon's own loader, and the
+  rewrite (temp file in the same directory, rename) keeps the existing mode and
+  owner.
+- `remove-user` refuses to remove the last user.
+- Both print that changes apply on `SIGHUP`: `auto_reload` does not watch the
+  credentials file.
+- `token` prints a bearer token for curl (`-H @<(...)` keeps it out of argv);
+  `stream` authenticates to a `tcp` sink and copies the stream to stdout.
+- TLS flags: `-ca-file`, `-server-name`, `-cert-file`, `-key-file`. There is no
+  insecure flag.
+
+## Rollout and Rotation
+
+- Turning SCRAM on is per listener and cuts off unconfigured dialers. To migrate
+  without a gap, upgrade binaries, add a second SCRAM listener, move dialers,
+  then remove the old listener.
+- Password rotation: `add-user -generate`, `SIGHUP` the listener, deploy the new
+  password file, `SIGHUP` the dialer. The dialer retries under backoff in
+  between.
+- Revocation: `remove-user`, `SIGHUP`. All tokens die with the reload.
+
+## Verification
+
+Go tests, one per rule: binding (match, mismatch, one-sided, length) in `auth`;
+in `authz` the validation table, credential loading, decoy stability across
+edits, TCP exchange over `net.Pipe` (success, wrong password equals unknown
+user, binding mismatch, missing hello, silent peer within the deadline,
+abandoned exchange frees its slot, final and first entry in one write, assert
+mismatch gets an error rather than a final), HTTP exchange on a TLS test server
+(token accepted, garbage and foreign tokens `401`, forged final yields no token,
+a different certificate after step 1 refused before the body is sent), the
+limiter bound; `http_chain` sink re-authentication and outcome table; CLI
+add/remove/rotate, mode preservation, last-user refusal, password trimming.
+
+`test/scram-chain-test.sh --auto` (ports 15821-15825): a relay with SCRAM on all
+four listener types plus one `client_auth` + SCRAM port; authorized edges over
+both chain transports; node labels forced to usernames; wrong password, unknown
+user and no-auth edges deliver nothing; a `tcp` sink viewer through `logwisp auth
+stream` held past the exchange deadline; a raw TLS client without a hello gets
+nothing; the `http` sink through `logwisp auth token` and curl; missing and bad
+tokens get `401`; `remove-user` + `SIGHUP` revokes token and login; throttling
+last. The existing scripts keep passing.
+
+## mTLS Hardening
+
+Shipped with this plan, independent of SCRAM:
+
+- The `http_chain` sink no longer follows redirects. Go's client resends the
+  body on a 307/308, including from `https` to plaintext `http`.
+- Its response drain is bounded (64 KiB).
+- The `tcp` sink tracks connections from accept, so `Stop` and reloads no longer
+  wait out the 10 s handshake timeout of a silent peer.
+- Unknown keys in any plugin's config, at any depth, fail construction: a typo
+  such as `[...tls] enabeld = true` used to switch protection off silently.
+- Startup and every reload warn about certificates that expired, are not yet
+  valid, or expire within 30 days; about `insecure_skip_verify`; about
+  `allow_patterns` that are not anchored at both ends of every alternative; and,
+  once per path, about key files every local user can read.
+- An `http` sink with an auth policy no longer sends
+  `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`.

doc/security.md

@@ -14,16 +14,16 @@ configure it, and — equally important — what it does not yet do.
 | Authorization from peer identity (allow-lists, node binding) | Implemented — see [The Auth Block](#the-auth-block) |
 | Authentication on the `http` sink's stream and status endpoints | Implemented, via the auth block |
 | Server identity pinning by dialers | Implemented, via the auth block |
+| Startup warnings for expiring certificates and risky settings | Implemented — see [Startup Warnings](#startup-warnings) |
+| Unknown configuration keys rejected | Implemented — a typo in `tls` or `auth` fails startup |
 | Certificate revocation lists (CRL) or OCSP | **Not implemented** — revoke by editing the allow-list |
-| Password, token, or SCRAM authentication | **Removed**; not currently available |
+| Password (Argon2id-SCRAM) authentication | **Planned** — see [scram-auth-plan.md](scram-auth-plan.md) |
 | IP allow/deny lists, per-IP connection or request limits | **Not implemented** |
 
-Earlier releases carried basic-auth, bearer-token, and SCRAM authentication.
+Certificates are the credential the transport already carries, so they are what
-Those were removed during the move to the plugin/flow architecture and the
+authentication is built on today: the `tls` block establishes that a peer chains
-switch to standard-library networking. Certificates are the one credential the
+to your CA, and the `auth` block decides which peers that CA vouches for may
-transport still carries, so they are what authentication is built on: the `tls`
+actually do what.
-block establishes that a peer chains to your CA, and the `auth` block decides
-which peers that CA vouches for may actually do what.
 
 ## The TLS Block
 
@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@ Misconfiguration fails at plugin construction, before the pipeline starts:
 - a certificate or key that will not load, or a CA file containing no
   certificates
 - a `min_version` that is neither `"1.2"` nor `"1.3"`
+- a key the plugin does not know, at any depth: `unknown key "tls.enabeld"`. A
+  misspelled option must not silently leave a protection switched off
 
 ## The Auth Block
 
@@ -144,7 +146,8 @@ WARN msg="Auth policy admits any identity the configured CA vouches for"
 ```
 
 Anchor your patterns. `allow_patterns = ["edge-\\d{2}"]` matches
-`evil-edge-01-impostor`; `["^edge-\\d{2}$"]` does not.
+`evil-edge-01-impostor`; `["^edge-\\d{2}$"]` does not. An unanchored pattern is
+reported at startup.
 
 ### Node binding
 
@@ -204,6 +207,18 @@ Misconfiguration fails at plugin construction, before the pipeline starts:
 
 Errors read like `auth: type "mtls" requires tls.client_auth`.
 
+## Startup Warnings
+
+Some settings work but are usually mistakes. Each plugin reports them at WARN
+when it is constructed, so startup and every reload repeat them:
+
+- a certificate in `cert_file`, `ca_file` or `client_ca_file` that has expired,
+  is not yet valid, or expires within 30 days
+- `insecure_skip_verify` on a dialer
+- an `allow_patterns` entry not anchored at both ends of every alternative
+  (`^a|b$` admits `a…` and `…b`)
+- a `key_file` every local user can read (once per path per process)
+
 ## Enabling mTLS
 
 ### 1. Generate a CA and certificates
@@ -339,7 +354,7 @@ interface or front them with an authenticating proxy.
 
 | Surface | Exposure when `auth.type = "none"` |
 |---------|-----------------------------------|
-| `http` sink `stream_path` | Full log stream, with `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`, so any browser origin can read it |
+| `http` sink `stream_path` | Full log stream, with `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`, so any browser origin can read it (the header is omitted once an auth policy is set) |
 | `http` sink `status_path` | Host, port, TLS flag, uptime, client counts, throughput counters |
 | `tcp` sink | Full log stream to any client that connects |
 | `tcp_chain` / `http_chain` source | Ingest from any peer the CA vouches for, under any node label it claims |
@@ -356,11 +371,12 @@ way to authenticate a plaintext listener.
 
 - Use a dedicated CA for LogWisp so its trust decisions stay independent.
 - Keep leaf lifetimes short (90–825 days) and automate renewal.
-- Key files should be `0600` and owned by the service account.
+- Key files should be `0600` and owned by the service account; a world-readable
+  one is reported at startup.
 - Rotation requires a reload (`SIGHUP`), because certificates are loaded once at
   plugin construction; there is no on-disk watch for certificate files.
-- Check expiry yourself: `openssl x509 -in relay.crt -noout -enddate`. Nothing
+- Startup and every reload warn 30 days before a certificate lapses. Still
-  warns before a certificate lapses; it surfaces as a handshake failure.
+  automate renewal; the warning only reaches someone reading the log.
 - Keep the identity field you authorize on stable across rotations. Reissuing a
   leaf with a different CN silently drops the peer out of the allow list.
 
@@ -369,7 +385,8 @@ way to authenticate a plaintext listener.
 - Prefer `min_version = "1.3"`. Drop to `"1.2"` only for a peer that genuinely
   cannot do 1.3.
 - Never enable `insecure_skip_verify` outside a lab; it disables server
-  verification entirely and makes the connection trivially interceptable.
+  verification entirely and makes the connection trivially interceptable. It is
+  reported at startup.
 - Bind listeners to specific interfaces rather than `0.0.0.0` where you can.
 - On any ingest port reachable from a network you do not fully control, set
   `auth.type = "mtls"` with an explicit `allow` list. `trust_node = false` is the

doc/sinks.md

@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ counters.
 
 > Without an `auth` block both endpoints are unauthenticated, and the stream
 > response carries `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`, so any web origin can read
-> it. Set `auth.type = "mtls"` (which requires `tls.client_auth`), bind to a
+> it. With one, the header is omitted. Set `auth.type = "mtls"` (which requires `tls.client_auth`), bind to a
 > trusted interface, or put an authenticating reverse proxy in front.
 
 ---
@@ -363,6 +363,8 @@ key_file  = "/etc/logwisp/tls/client.key"
 - Retries apply to transport errors, `408`, `429`, and `5xx`. Any other
   non-2xx response is treated as permanent, and the batch is dropped and counted
   in `dropped_batches`.
+- Redirects are never followed; a `3xx` is permanent too. Following one would
+  resend the batch wherever the response points, plaintext `http` included.
 - HTTP/2 is off by design; batched NDJSON POSTs gain nothing from it.
 - On shutdown a single best-effort flush of the pending batch is attempted.
 

go.mod

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ module logwisp
 go 1.27.1
 
 require (
-	github.com/lixenwraith/config v0.1.1-0.20260929051144-5132718bd627
+	github.com/lixenwraith/config v0.2.1
-	github.com/lixenwraith/log v0.1.1-0.20260926182514-9ad925351aa1
+	github.com/lixenwraith/log v0.1.11
 )
 
-require github.com/lixenwraith/toml v0.0.0-20260928180512-b59d068ff6a4 // indirect
+require github.com/lixenwraith/toml v0.0.0-20261001212158-cede215365c0 // indirect

go.sum

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-github.com/lixenwraith/config v0.1.1-0.20260929051144-5132718bd627 h1:PkSnFbvJWaf7cl4txDwglYFreet0QJypBD2XNOo5cc4=
+github.com/lixenwraith/config v0.2.1 h1:a1VLWhtAi1F7FWtRtFVpPkvemnBEf+4xrvDupvwHYtg=
-github.com/lixenwraith/config v0.1.1-0.20260929051144-5132718bd627/go.mod h1:yfJQwKS+/6Dg70GIoHeYc0eYztOPETpqe6nUIbakcyg=
+github.com/lixenwraith/config v0.2.1/go.mod h1:yfJQwKS+/6Dg70GIoHeYc0eYztOPETpqe6nUIbakcyg=
-github.com/lixenwraith/log v0.1.1-0.20260926182514-9ad925351aa1 h1:fdVY7Jbg+GR61BA6zlvX4N2RFtgzCvSuWeOscicTb8I=
+github.com/lixenwraith/log v0.1.11 h1:dKWLnaR8dhXxj4l/aU5XZiFIsr8geaJQbOf8m7SiKhU=
-github.com/lixenwraith/log v0.1.1-0.20260926182514-9ad925351aa1/go.mod h1:EE8i5nSAW2yZBTytKuhdgehmgzrby6kW1k5DyH1SvBg=
+github.com/lixenwraith/log v0.1.11/go.mod h1:EE8i5nSAW2yZBTytKuhdgehmgzrby6kW1k5DyH1SvBg=
-github.com/lixenwraith/toml v0.0.0-20260928180512-b59d068ff6a4 h1:9qZU0iBIsqintDh39vieio0ygLiRrPmCEo6Ra45EQyY=
+github.com/lixenwraith/toml v0.0.0-20261001212158-cede215365c0 h1:ue1pILlQAovrxTMSaKII4AbZ7yY4mNs3cyivoSBwMmA=
-github.com/lixenwraith/toml v0.0.0-20260928180512-b59d068ff6a4/go.mod h1:itcT/Vt5mwmX9KVGCMsWZr6vbU/JgZ24wV/I0J5cMt0=
+github.com/lixenwraith/toml v0.0.0-20261001212158-cede215365c0/go.mod h1:itcT/Vt5mwmX9KVGCMsWZr6vbU/JgZ24wV/I0J5cMt0=

internal/authz/authz.go

@@ -12,11 +12,14 @@ import (
 	"crypto/tls"
 	"fmt"
 	"regexp"
+	"regexp/syntax"
 	"strings"
 	"sync/atomic"
 
 	"logwisp/internal/config"
 	"logwisp/internal/tlsx"
+
+	"github.com/lixenwraith/log"
 )
 
 // Authentication methods
@@ -276,6 +279,73 @@ func (p *Policy) Unrestricted() bool {
 	return p != nil && len(p.allow) == 0 && len(p.patterns) == 0
 }
 
+// LogStartup reports, once per plugin construction, what a listener policy
+// admits, how it labels nodes, and allow patterns that admit more than they
+// appear to. trustNode matters only for chain sources.
+func (p *Policy) LogStartup(l *log.Logger, component, id string, trustNode bool) {
+	if p == nil || p.role == RoleDialer {
+		return
+	}
+	if p.Unrestricted() {
+		l.Warn("msg", "Auth policy admits any identity the configured CA vouches for",
+			"component", component,
+			"instance_id", id,
+			"hint", "set auth.allow or auth.allow_patterns to authorize named peers")
+	}
+	if p.BindsNode() {
+		l.Info("msg", "Node labels bound to peer identity; trust_node is ignored",
+			"component", component,
+			"instance_id", id,
+			"node_binding", p.binding,
+			"trust_node", trustNode)
+	}
+	for _, re := range p.patterns {
+		if !anchored(re.String()) {
+			l.Warn("msg", "auth.allow_patterns entry is not anchored and matches any identity containing it",
+				"component", component,
+				"instance_id", id,
+				"pattern", re.String(),
+				"hint", "anchor every alternative, e.g. ^(edge-01|edge-02)$")
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// anchored reports whether every match of pattern spans the whole identity:
+// each alternative must start with ^ and end with $. "^a|b$" is the classic
+// miss, admitting "a..." and "...b".
+func anchored(pattern string) bool {
+	re, err := syntax.Parse(pattern, syntax.Perl)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	re = re.Simplify()
+	return anchoredAt(re, syntax.OpBeginText) && anchoredAt(re, syntax.OpEndText)
+}
+
+// anchoredAt follows the matching edge of re (first or last element of a
+// concatenation, every branch of an alternation) down to the anchor op.
+func anchoredAt(re *syntax.Regexp, anchor syntax.Op) bool {
+	switch re.Op {
+	case anchor:
+		return true
+	case syntax.OpCapture:
+		return anchoredAt(re.Sub[0], anchor)
+	case syntax.OpConcat:
+		if anchor == syntax.OpBeginText {
+			return anchoredAt(re.Sub[0], anchor)
+		}
+		return anchoredAt(re.Sub[len(re.Sub)-1], anchor)
+	case syntax.OpAlternate:
+		for _, sub := range re.Sub {
+			if !anchoredAt(sub, anchor) {
+				return false
+			}
+		}
+		return true
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
 // Describe renders the policy for a startup log line
 func (p *Policy) Describe() string {
 	if p == nil {

internal/authz/authz_test.go

@@ -296,3 +296,22 @@ func TestVerifyConnectionPinsServer(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Error("unpinned server accepted")
 	}
 }
+
+// Only patterns whose every alternative is pinned at both ends stay silent at
+// startup; "^a|b$" reads as anchored but admits "a..." and "...b".
+func TestAllowPatternAnchoring(t *testing.T) {
+	for pattern, want := range map[string]bool{
+		`^edge-\d{2}$`:        true,
+		`^(edge-01|edge-02)$`: true,
+		`^edge-a$|^edge-bc$`:  true, // the parser factors this into ^edge-(?:a$|bc$)
+		`\Aedge\z`:            true,
+		`edge-\d{2}`:          false,
+		`^a|b$`:               false,
+		`^ab$|^ac`:            false,
+		`^a$|`:                false,
+	} {
+		if got := anchored(pattern); got != want {
+			t.Errorf("anchored(%q) = %v, want %v", pattern, got, want)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/config/loader_test.go

@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@ import (
 	"time"
 
 	"logwisp/internal/testutil"
-
-	lconfig "github.com/lixenwraith/config"
 )
 
 func TestResolveConfigArguments(t *testing.T) {
@@ -185,7 +183,7 @@ allow = ["one", "two"]
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 	opts := TCPSinkOptions{Host: "127.0.0.1", BufferSize: 1000}
-	if err := lconfig.ScanMap(cfg.Pipelines[0].PluginSinks[0].Config, &opts); err != nil {
+	if err := Scan(cfg.Pipelines[0].PluginSinks[0].Config, &opts); err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 	if opts.Host != "127.0.0.1" || opts.BufferSize != 1000 || opts.Port != 9000 || opts.WriteTimeoutMS != 9007199254740993 ||
@@ -193,3 +191,40 @@ allow = ["one", "two"]
 		t.Fatalf("plugin defaults, nested tables or integer precision lost: %+v", opts)
 	}
 }
+
+// A misspelled key, even inside a nested tls or auth table, fails plugin
+// construction instead of leaving the protection it named switched off.
+func TestPluginConfigRejectsUnknownKeys(t *testing.T) {
+	isolateConfig(t)
+	for key, table := range map[string]string{
+		"bogus":       "bogus = true",
+		"tls.enabeld": "[pipelines.plugin_sinks.config.tls]\nenabeld = true",
+		"auth.tpye":   "[pipelines.plugin_sinks.config.auth]\ntpye = \"mtls\"",
+	} {
+		testutil.WriteFile(t, "plugins.toml", `
+[[pipelines]]
+name = "typo"
+[[pipelines.plugin_sources]]
+id = "in"
+type = "null"
+[[pipelines.plugin_sinks]]
+id = "out"
+type = "tcp"
+[pipelines.plugin_sinks.config]
+port = 9000
+`+table+"\n")
+		m, err := Load([]string{"-c", "plugins.toml"})
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		cfg, err := m.Snapshot()
+		m.Close()
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		err = Scan(cfg.Pipelines[0].PluginSinks[0].Config, &TCPSinkOptions{})
+		if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), `"`+key+`"`) {
+			t.Errorf("unknown key %s: err = %v", key, err)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/config/validate.go

@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ package config
 
 import (
 	"fmt"
+	"maps"
+	"reflect"
+	"slices"
+	"strings"
 
 	lconfig "github.com/lixenwraith/config"
 )
@@ -81,3 +85,55 @@ func validateLogConfig(cfg *LogConfig) error {
 
 	return nil
 }
+
+// Scan decodes a plugin's config map into target, rejecting keys target does
+// not declare: a misspelled tls or auth key must fail, not silently disable
+// the protection it was meant to configure.
+func Scan(configMap map[string]any, target any) error {
+	if err := unknownKeys(configMap, reflect.TypeOf(target), ""); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return lconfig.ScanMap(configMap, target)
+}
+
+// unknownKeys walks nested tables against the toml tags of t. Map-typed fields
+// hold free-form keys and are not descended into.
+func unknownKeys(m map[string]any, t reflect.Type, prefix string) error {
+	for t.Kind() == reflect.Pointer || t.Kind() == reflect.Slice {
+		t = t.Elem()
+	}
+	if t.Kind() != reflect.Struct {
+		return nil
+	}
+	fields := make(map[string]reflect.Type, t.NumField())
+	for f := range t.Fields() {
+		if name, _, _ := strings.Cut(f.Tag.Get("toml"), ","); name != "" && name != "-" {
+			fields[name] = f.Type
+		}
+	}
+	for _, key := range slices.Sorted(maps.Keys(m)) {
+		ft, ok := fields[key]
+		if !ok {
+			return fmt.Errorf("unknown key %q", prefix+key)
+		}
+		var tables []map[string]any
+		switch v := m[key].(type) {
+		case map[string]any:
+			tables = []map[string]any{v}
+		case []map[string]any:
+			tables = v
+		case []any:
+			for _, e := range v {
+				if table, ok := e.(map[string]any); ok {
+					tables = append(tables, table)
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		for _, table := range tables {
+			if err := unknownKeys(table, ft, prefix+key+"."); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}

internal/sink/console/console.go

@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ func NewConsoleSinkPlugin(
 	opts := &config.ConsoleSinkOptions{}
 
 	// Scan config map into struct
-	if err := lconfig.ScanMap(configMap, opts); err != nil {
+	if err := config.Scan(configMap, opts); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse config: %w", err)
 	}
 

internal/sink/file/file.go

@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ func NewFileSinkPlugin(
 	opts := &config.FileSinkOptions{}
 
 	// Scan config map into struct
-	if err := lconfig.ScanMap(configMap, opts); err != nil {
+	if err := config.Scan(configMap, opts); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse config: %w", err)
 	}
 

internal/sink/http/http.go

@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ func NewHTTPSinkPlugin(
 		Host:           DefaultHTTPHost,
 		WriteTimeoutMS: 0, // SSE indefinite streaming
 	}
-	if err := lconfig.ScanMap(configMap, opts); err != nil {
+	if err := config.Scan(configMap, opts); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse config: %w", err)
 	}
 	if err := lconfig.Port(opts.Port); err != nil {
@@ -167,12 +167,8 @@ func NewHTTPSinkPlugin(
 		"tls", tlsCfg != nil,
 		"mtls", tlsCfg != nil && tlsCfg.ClientAuth == tls.RequireAndVerifyClientCert,
 		"auth", authPolicy.Describe())
-	if authPolicy.Unrestricted() {
+	tlsx.LogWarnings(logger, "http_sink", id, opts.TLS, true)
-		logger.Warn("msg", "Auth policy admits any identity the configured CA vouches for",
+	authPolicy.LogStartup(logger, "http_sink", id, false)
-			"component", "http_sink",
-			"instance_id", id,
-			"hint", "set auth.allow or auth.allow_patterns to authorize named clients")
-	}
 	return h, nil
 }
 
@@ -407,7 +403,10 @@ func (h *HTTPSink) handleStream(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 
 	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream")
 	w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache")
+	if !h.auth.Enabled() {
+		// An authenticated stream is not offered to every web origin
 		w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")
+	}
 	w.Header().Set("X-Accel-Buffering", "no")
 	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
 

internal/sink/http/http_test.go

@@ -2,13 +2,18 @@ package http
 
 import (
 	"bufio"
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"crypto/x509"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
+	"os"
+	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 
 	"logwisp/internal/sink"
+	"logwisp/internal/testutil"
 )
 
 func TestStatusReportsQueueAndConnectionBounds(t *testing.T) {
@@ -119,3 +124,48 @@ func TestHeadOnStreamPathIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("sessions after HEAD = %d, want 0", n)
 	}
 }
+
+// A stream gated by an auth policy is not offered to every web origin; an
+// open stream keeps the wildcard so browser dashboards still work.
+func TestWildcardCORSOnlyWithoutAuth(t *testing.T) {
+	pki := testutil.NewPKI(t, "viewer-01")
+	caPEM, err := os.ReadFile(pki.CA)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	roots := x509.NewCertPool()
+	roots.AppendCertsFromPEM(caPEM)
+	clientCert, err := tls.LoadX509KeyPair(pki.ClientCert, pki.ClientKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	open, _ := newTestHTTPSink(t, nil)
+	gated, _ := newTestHTTPSink(t, map[string]any{
+		"tls": map[string]any{"enabled": true, "cert_file": pki.ServerCert, "key_file": pki.ServerKey,
+			"client_auth": true, "client_ca_file": pki.CA},
+		"auth": map[string]any{"type": "mtls", "allow": []any{"viewer-01"}},
+	})
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name string
+		sink *HTTPSink
+		want string
+	}{{"open", open, "*"}, {"gated", gated, ""}} {
+		client, baseURL := serveTestHTTPSink(t, tc.sink)
+		if tc.sink.tlsConfig != nil {
+			client.Transport = &http.Transport{TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{RootCAs: roots, Certificates: []tls.Certificate{clientCert}}}
+			baseURL = "https" + strings.TrimPrefix(baseURL, "http")
+		}
+		resp, err := client.Get(baseURL + "/stream")
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: %v", tc.name, err)
+		}
+		resp.Body.Close()
+		if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: GET /stream = %d", tc.name, resp.StatusCode)
+		}
+		if got := resp.Header.Get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin"); got != tc.want {
+			t.Errorf("%s: Access-Control-Allow-Origin = %q, want %q", tc.name, got, tc.want)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/sink/httpchain/httpchain.go

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ const (
 	DefaultHTTPChainSinkRequestTimeoutMS = 10000
 	DefaultHTTPChainSinkBackoffMinMS     = 500
 	DefaultHTTPChainSinkBackoffMaxMS     = 30000
+	maxResponseDrain                     = 64 * 1024
 )
 
 // HTTPChainSink batches structured entries and posts NDJSON to a downstream
@@ -92,7 +93,7 @@ func NewHTTPChainSinkPlugin(
 	proxy *session.Proxy,
 ) (sink.Sink, error) {
 	opts := &config.HTTPChainSinkOptions{}
-	if err := lconfig.ScanMap(configMap, opts); err != nil {
+	if err := config.Scan(configMap, opts); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse config: %w", err)
 	}
 	if err := lconfig.NonEmpty(opts.Host); err != nil {
@@ -182,7 +183,11 @@ func NewHTTPChainSinkPlugin(
 		mtls:       tlsCfg != nil && len(tlsCfg.Certificates) > 0,
 		auth:       authPolicy,
 		url:        scheme + "://" + addr + opts.IngestPath,
-		client:     &http.Client{Transport: transport},
+		// A redirect would resend the batch, even from https to plaintext http
+		client: &http.Client{
+			Transport:     transport,
+			CheckRedirect: func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error { return http.ErrUseLastResponse },
+		},
 		input:      make(chan core.TransportEvent, opts.BufferSize),
 		done:       make(chan struct{}),
 		logger:     logger,
@@ -208,6 +213,7 @@ func NewHTTPChainSinkPlugin(
 		"tls", t.tlsEnabled,
 		"mtls", t.mtls,
 		"auth", authPolicy.Describe())
+	tlsx.LogWarnings(logger, "http_chain_sink", id, opts.TLS, false)
 	return t, nil
 }
 
@@ -436,8 +442,8 @@ func (t *HTTPChainSink) post(ctx context.Context, body []byte) (transient bool,
 		return true, err
 	}
 	defer resp.Body.Close()
-	// Drain for connection reuse
+	// Drain for connection reuse, bounded so a hostile peer cannot stream forever
-	io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body)
+	io.Copy(io.Discard, io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxResponseDrain))
 
 	switch {
 	case resp.StatusCode >= 200 && resp.StatusCode < 300:

internal/sink/httpchain/httpchain_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+package httpchain
+
+import (
+	"net"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strconv"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"logwisp/internal/session"
+
+	"github.com/lixenwraith/log"
+)
+
+// A redirect is never followed: it would resend the batch wherever the
+// response points, plaintext http included.
+func TestRedirectIsNotFollowed(t *testing.T) {
+	var leaked atomic.Bool
+	target := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) { leaked.Store(true) }))
+	t.Cleanup(target.Close)
+	redirector := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		http.Redirect(w, r, target.URL+r.URL.Path, http.StatusPermanentRedirect)
+	}))
+	t.Cleanup(redirector.Close)
+
+	host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(redirector.Listener.Addr().String())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	p, _ := strconv.ParseInt(port, 10, 64)
+	manager := session.NewManager(time.Hour)
+	t.Cleanup(manager.Stop)
+	created, err := NewHTTPChainSinkPlugin("fwd", map[string]any{"host": host, "port": p},
+		log.NewLogger(), session.NewProxy(manager, "fwd"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	transient, err := created.(*HTTPChainSink).post(t.Context(), []byte("{}\n"))
+	if err == nil || transient {
+		t.Fatalf("post = (transient %v, %v), want a permanent error", transient, err)
+	}
+	if leaked.Load() {
+		t.Fatal("the batch followed the redirect")
+	}
+}

internal/sink/null/null.go

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"time"
 
+	"logwisp/internal/config"
 	"logwisp/internal/core"
 	"logwisp/internal/plugin"
 	"logwisp/internal/session"
@@ -49,6 +50,9 @@ func NewNullSinkPlugin(
 	logger *log.Logger,
 	proxy *session.Proxy,
 ) (sink.Sink, error) {
+	if err := config.Scan(configMap, &config.NullSinkOptions{}); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse config: %w", err)
+	}
 	ns := &NullSink{
 		id:     id,
 		proxy:  proxy,

internal/sink/tcp/tcp.go

@@ -58,8 +58,10 @@ type TCPSink struct {
 	input  chan core.TransportEvent
 	logger *log.Logger
 
-	// Client registry
+	// Client registry. conns holds every accepted connection, so shutdown also
+	// reaches peers still in the handshake, before they become clients.
 	clients      map[uint64]*tcpClient
+	conns        map[net.Conn]struct{}
 	clientsMu    sync.Mutex
 	nextClientID atomic.Uint64
 	writeTimeout time.Duration
@@ -86,11 +88,10 @@ type TCPSink struct {
 	lastProcessed  atomic.Value // time.Time
 }
 
-// tcpClient pairs a connection with its bounded send queue.
+// tcpClient is a registered connection's bounded send queue.
 // send is written by the broadcast loop (non-blocking) and drained by the
 // writer goroutine; closed signals reader-detected disconnect.
 type tcpClient struct {
-	conn      net.Conn
 	send      chan []byte
 	sessionID string
 	closed    chan struct{}
@@ -107,7 +108,7 @@ func NewTCPSinkPlugin(
 		Host:      DefaultTCPHost,
 		KeepAlive: true,
 	}
-	if err := lconfig.ScanMap(configMap, opts); err != nil {
+	if err := config.Scan(configMap, opts); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse config: %w", err)
 	}
 	if err := lconfig.Port(opts.Port); err != nil {
@@ -143,6 +144,7 @@ func NewTCPSinkPlugin(
 		done:         make(chan struct{}),
 		logger:       logger,
 		clients:      make(map[uint64]*tcpClient),
+		conns:        make(map[net.Conn]struct{}),
 		writeTimeout: time.Duration(opts.WriteTimeoutMS) * time.Millisecond,
 		tlsConfig:    tlsCfg,
 		auth:         authPolicy,
@@ -157,12 +159,8 @@ func NewTCPSinkPlugin(
 		"tls", tlsCfg != nil,
 		"mtls", tlsCfg != nil && tlsCfg.ClientAuth == tls.RequireAndVerifyClientCert,
 		"auth", authPolicy.Describe())
-	if authPolicy.Unrestricted() {
+	tlsx.LogWarnings(logger, "tcp_sink", id, opts.TLS, true)
-		logger.Warn("msg", "Auth policy admits any identity the configured CA vouches for",
+	authPolicy.LogStartup(logger, "tcp_sink", id, false)
-			"component", "tcp_sink",
-			"instance_id", id,
-			"hint", "set auth.allow or auth.allow_patterns to authorize named clients")
-	}
 	return t, nil
 }
 
@@ -258,8 +256,8 @@ func (t *TCPSink) shutdown() {
 			t.listener.Close() // unblocks acceptLoop
 		}
 		t.clientsMu.Lock()
-		for _, c := range t.clients {
+		for conn := range t.conns {
-			c.conn.Close() // unblocks per-connection readers
+			conn.Close() // unblocks handshakes and per-connection readers
 		}
 		t.clientsMu.Unlock()
 	})
@@ -287,9 +285,17 @@ func (t *TCPSink) acceptLoop() {
 			continue
 		}
 
-		// Certificate authorization runs in handleConn post-handshake,
+		t.clientsMu.Lock()
-		// pre-registration. Password-auth extension point: preamble
+		select {
-		// verification belongs at the same place.
+		case <-t.done:
+			// shutdown already swept conns; this one would outlive it
+			t.clientsMu.Unlock()
+			conn.Close()
+			return
+		default:
+		}
+		t.conns[conn] = struct{}{}
+		t.clientsMu.Unlock()
 
 		t.wg.Add(1)
 		go t.handleConn(conn)
@@ -305,6 +311,10 @@ func (t *TCPSink) handleConn(conn net.Conn) {
 	// Counted from accept: max_connections bounds concurrent handshakes too
 	count := t.activeConns.Add(1)
 	defer func() {
+		conn.Close()
+		t.clientsMu.Lock()
+		delete(t.conns, conn)
+		t.clientsMu.Unlock()
 		newCount := t.activeConns.Add(-1)
 		t.logger.Debug("msg", "TCP connection closed",
 			"component", "tcp_sink",
@@ -327,7 +337,6 @@ func (t *TCPSink) handleConn(conn net.Conn) {
 				"component", "tcp_sink",
 				"remote_addr", remote,
 				"error", err)
-			conn.Close()
 			return
 		}
 		cs := tc.ConnectionState()
@@ -348,14 +357,12 @@ func (t *TCPSink) handleConn(conn net.Conn) {
 			"instance_id", t.id,
 			"remote_addr", remote,
 			"error", err)
-		conn.Close()
 		return
 	}
 	ident.Apply(meta)
 
 	sess := t.proxy.CreateSession(remote, meta)
 	c := &tcpClient{
-		conn:      conn,
 		send:      make(chan []byte, t.config.ClientBufferSize),
 		sessionID: sess.ID,
 		closed:    make(chan struct{}),

internal/sink/tcp/tcp_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+package tcp
+
+import (
+	"net"
+	"strconv"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"logwisp/internal/session"
+	"logwisp/internal/testutil"
+
+	"github.com/lixenwraith/log"
+)
+
+// A peer that connects and never completes the TLS handshake does not hold
+// Stop for the handshake timeout: shutdown reaches connections before they
+// become clients.
+func TestStopDoesNotWaitForSilentHandshake(t *testing.T) {
+	pki := testutil.NewPKI(t, "viewer")
+	probe, err := net.Listen("tcp4", "127.0.0.1:0")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	addr := probe.Addr().String()
+	probe.Close()
+	_, port, _ := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
+	p, _ := strconv.ParseInt(port, 10, 64)
+
+	manager := session.NewManager(time.Hour)
+	t.Cleanup(manager.Stop)
+	created, err := NewTCPSinkPlugin("out", map[string]any{
+		"host": "127.0.0.1",
+		"port": p,
+		"tls":  map[string]any{"enabled": true, "cert_file": pki.ServerCert, "key_file": pki.ServerKey},
+	}, log.NewLogger(), session.NewProxy(manager, "out"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	sink := created.(*TCPSink)
+	if err := sink.Start(t.Context()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	conn, err := net.Dial("tcp4", addr)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { conn.Close() })
+	for deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second); sink.activeConns.Load() == 0; time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond) {
+		if time.Now().After(deadline) {
+			t.Fatal("connection never reached the handshake")
+		}
+	}
+
+	start := time.Now()
+	sink.Stop()
+	if d := time.Since(start); d > 2*time.Second {
+		t.Fatalf("Stop took %v with a silent peer in the handshake", d)
+	}
+}

internal/sink/tcpchain/tcpchain.go

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"maps"
-	"math/rand/v2"
 	"net"
 	"os"
 	"strconv"
@@ -88,7 +87,7 @@ func NewTCPChainSinkPlugin(
 	opts := &config.TCPChainSinkOptions{
 		KeepAlive: true,
 	}
-	if err := lconfig.ScanMap(configMap, opts); err != nil {
+	if err := config.Scan(configMap, opts); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse config: %w", err)
 	}
 	if err := lconfig.NonEmpty(opts.Host); err != nil {
@@ -179,6 +178,7 @@ func NewTCPChainSinkPlugin(
 		"tls", tlsCfg != nil,
 		"mtls", tlsCfg != nil && len(tlsCfg.Certificates) > 0,
 		"auth", authPolicy.Describe())
+	tlsx.LogWarnings(logger, "tcp_chain_sink", id, opts.TLS, false)
 	return t, nil
 }
 
@@ -299,24 +299,6 @@ func (t *TCPChainSink) runLoop(ctx context.Context) {
 	}
 }
 
-// toEntry extracts the structured entry, stamping node identity at first hop
-func (t *TCPChainSink) toEntry(event core.TransportEvent) core.LogEntry {
-	entry := event.Entry
-	if entry.Time.IsZero() {
-		// Defensive: event without structured entry, wrap formatted payload
-		t.synthesized.Add(1)
-		entry = core.LogEntry{
-			Time:    event.Time,
-			Source:  t.id,
-			Message: string(event.Payload),
-		}
-	}
-	if entry.Node == "" {
-		entry.Node = t.node
-	}
-	return entry
-}
-
 // deliver writes one line, holding it across reconnects until sent or shutdown.
 // Backpressure during outage propagates to the pipeline dispatch drop counter.
 func (t *TCPChainSink) deliver(ctx context.Context, line []byte) bool {
@@ -427,17 +409,3 @@ func (t *TCPChainSink) waitBackoff(ctx context.Context, failures int) bool {
 		return false
 	}
 }
-
-// backoffDelay computes exponential backoff with ±20% jitter
-func (t *TCPChainSink) backoffDelay(failures int) time.Duration {
-	minD := time.Duration(t.config.BackoffMinMS) * time.Millisecond
-	maxD := time.Duration(t.config.BackoffMaxMS) * time.Millisecond
-
-	d := maxD
-	if failures < 63 {
-		if v := minD << uint(failures-1); v > 0 && v < maxD {
-			d = v
-		}
-	}
-	return d - d/5 + time.Duration(rand.Int64N(int64(2*d/5)+1))
-}

internal/source/console/console.go

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import (
 	"logwisp/internal/session"
 	"logwisp/internal/source"
 
-	lconfig "github.com/lixenwraith/config"
 	"github.com/lixenwraith/log"
 )
 
@@ -70,7 +69,7 @@ func NewConsoleSourcePlugin(
 	opts := &config.ConsoleSourceOptions{}
 
 	// Scan config map
-	if err := lconfig.ScanMap(configMap, opts); err != nil {
+	if err := config.Scan(configMap, opts); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse config: %w", err)
 	}
 

internal/source/file/file.go

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ func NewFileSourcePlugin(
 	opts := &config.FileSourceOptions{}
 
 	// Use lconfig to scan map into struct (overriding defaults)
-	if err := lconfig.ScanMap(configMap, opts); err != nil {
+	if err := config.Scan(configMap, opts); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse config: %w", err)
 	}
 

internal/source/httpchain/httpchain.go

@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ func NewHTTPChainSourcePlugin(
 		Host:      "0.0.0.0",
 		TrustNode: true,
 	}
-	if err := lconfig.ScanMap(configMap, opts); err != nil {
+	if err := config.Scan(configMap, opts); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse config: %w", err)
 	}
 	if err := lconfig.Port(opts.Port); err != nil {
@@ -135,19 +135,8 @@ func NewHTTPChainSourcePlugin(
 		"tls", tlsCfg != nil,
 		"mtls", tlsCfg != nil && tlsCfg.ClientAuth == tls.RequireAndVerifyClientCert,
 		"auth", authPolicy.Describe())
-	if authPolicy.Unrestricted() {
+	tlsx.LogWarnings(logger, "http_chain_source", id, opts.TLS, true)
-		logger.Warn("msg", "Auth policy admits any identity the configured CA vouches for",
+	authPolicy.LogStartup(logger, "http_chain_source", id, opts.TrustNode)
-			"component", "http_chain_source",
-			"instance_id", id,
-			"hint", "set auth.allow or auth.allow_patterns to authorize named peers")
-	}
-	if authPolicy.BindsNode() {
-		logger.Info("msg", "Node labels bound to peer identity; trust_node is ignored",
-			"component", "http_chain_source",
-			"instance_id", id,
-			"node_binding", authPolicy.NodeBinding(),
-			"trust_node", opts.TrustNode)
-	}
 	return s, nil
 }
 

internal/source/null/null.go

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"time"
 
+	"logwisp/internal/config"
 	"logwisp/internal/core"
 	"logwisp/internal/plugin"
 	"logwisp/internal/session"
@@ -47,6 +48,9 @@ func NewNullSourcePlugin(
 	logger *log.Logger,
 	proxy *session.Proxy,
 ) (source.Source, error) {
+	if err := config.Scan(configMap, &config.NullSourceOptions{}); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse config: %w", err)
+	}
 	ns := &NullSource{
 		id:          id,
 		proxy:       proxy,

internal/source/random/random.go

@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ func NewRandomSourcePlugin(
 	}
 
 	// Scan config map
-	if err := lconfig.ScanMap(configMap, opts); err != nil {
+	if err := config.Scan(configMap, opts); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse config: %w", err)
 	}
 

internal/source/tcpchain/tcpchain.go

@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ func NewTCPChainSourcePlugin(
 		Host:      "0.0.0.0",
 		TrustNode: true,
 	}
-	if err := lconfig.ScanMap(configMap, opts); err != nil {
+	if err := config.Scan(configMap, opts); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse config: %w", err)
 	}
 	if err := lconfig.Port(opts.Port); err != nil {
@@ -121,19 +121,8 @@ func NewTCPChainSourcePlugin(
 		"tls", tlsCfg != nil,
 		"mtls", tlsCfg != nil && tlsCfg.ClientAuth == tls.RequireAndVerifyClientCert,
 		"auth", authPolicy.Describe())
-	if authPolicy.Unrestricted() {
+	tlsx.LogWarnings(logger, "tcp_chain_source", id, opts.TLS, true)
-		logger.Warn("msg", "Auth policy admits any identity the configured CA vouches for",
+	authPolicy.LogStartup(logger, "tcp_chain_source", id, opts.TrustNode)
-			"component", "tcp_chain_source",
-			"instance_id", id,
-			"hint", "set auth.allow or auth.allow_patterns to authorize named peers")
-	}
-	if authPolicy.BindsNode() {
-		logger.Info("msg", "Node labels bound to peer identity; trust_node is ignored",
-			"component", "tcp_chain_source",
-			"instance_id", id,
-			"node_binding", authPolicy.NodeBinding(),
-			"trust_node", opts.TrustNode)
-	}
 	return s, nil
 }
 

internal/testutil/fixtures.go

@@ -3,9 +3,19 @@
 package testutil
 
 import (
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"crypto/x509/pkix"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"math/big"
+	"net"
 	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
+	"time"
 )
 
 // ClearEnvPrefix isolates overrides while preserving the caller's environment.
@@ -29,3 +39,64 @@ func WriteFile(t testing.TB, path, contents string) {
 		t.Fatalf("write fixture %q: %v", path, err)
 	}
 }
+
+// PKI is a throwaway CA with a server certificate for 127.0.0.1 and one client
+// certificate, written as PEM files for plugins that load TLS from disk.
+type PKI struct {
+	CA, ServerCert, ServerKey, ClientCert, ClientKey string
+}
+
+// NewPKI issues the PKI into a test directory; clientCN names the client.
+func NewPKI(t testing.TB, clientCN string) PKI {
+	t.Helper()
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	now := time.Now()
+	caKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	caTmpl := &x509.Certificate{
+		SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1), Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "LogWisp Test CA"},
+		NotBefore: now.Add(-time.Hour), NotAfter: now.Add(24 * time.Hour),
+		IsCA: true, BasicConstraintsValid: true, KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageCertSign,
+	}
+	caDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, caTmpl, caTmpl, &caKey.PublicKey, caKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	ca, err := x509.ParseCertificate(caDER)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	pki := PKI{CA: writePEM(t, dir, "ca.crt", "CERTIFICATE", caDER)}
+	issue := func(name, cn string, serial int64, usage x509.ExtKeyUsage, ips []net.IP) (string, string) {
+		key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
+			SerialNumber: big.NewInt(serial), Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: cn},
+			NotBefore: now.Add(-time.Hour), NotAfter: now.Add(24 * time.Hour),
+			KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature, ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{usage}, IPAddresses: ips,
+		}
+		der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, ca, &key.PublicKey, caKey)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		keyDER, err := x509.MarshalPKCS8PrivateKey(key)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		return writePEM(t, dir, name+".crt", "CERTIFICATE", der), writePEM(t, dir, name+".key", "PRIVATE KEY", keyDER)
+	}
+	pki.ServerCert, pki.ServerKey = issue("server", "relay.internal", 2, x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth, []net.IP{net.IPv4(127, 0, 0, 1)})
+	pki.ClientCert, pki.ClientKey = issue("client", clientCN, 3, x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth, nil)
+	return pki
+}
+
+func writePEM(t testing.TB, dir, name, blockType string, der []byte) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, name)
+	WriteFile(t, path, string(pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: blockType, Bytes: der})))
+	return path
+}

internal/tlsx/tlsx.go

@@ -6,10 +6,12 @@ package tlsx
 import (
 	"crypto/tls"
 	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/pem"
 	"fmt"
 	stdlog "log"
 	"os"
 	"strings"
+	"sync"
 	"time"
 
 	"logwisp/internal/config"
@@ -17,8 +19,12 @@ import (
 	"github.com/lixenwraith/log"
 )
 
-// HandshakeTimeout bounds TLS handshakes on both accept and dial paths
+const (
-const HandshakeTimeout = 10 * time.Second
+	// HandshakeTimeout bounds TLS handshakes on both accept and dial paths
+	HandshakeTimeout = 10 * time.Second
+	// expiryWindow is how far ahead startup announces certificate expiry
+	expiryWindow = 30 * 24 * time.Hour
+)
 
 // Server builds the *tls.Config for listener plugins
 // (tcp/http sinks, tcp_chain/http_chain sources). Returns (nil, nil) when disabled.
@@ -136,6 +142,93 @@ func PeerIdentity(cs tls.ConnectionState, mode string) string {
 	return ""
 }
 
+// LogWarnings reports TLS settings that work but are likely mistakes, once per
+// plugin construction, so each reload re-announces expiring certificates.
+func LogWarnings(l *log.Logger, component, id string, o *config.TLSOptions, listener bool) {
+	if o == nil || !o.Enabled {
+		return
+	}
+	var warnings []string
+	if !listener && o.InsecureSkipVerify {
+		warnings = append(warnings, "tls.insecure_skip_verify disables server verification: any peer can impersonate the server")
+	}
+	files := []struct{ key, path string }{{"cert_file", o.CertFile}, {"ca_file", o.CAFile}}
+	if listener {
+		files[1] = struct{ key, path string }{"client_ca_file", o.ClientCAFile}
+	}
+	now := time.Now()
+	for _, f := range files {
+		for _, c := range readCerts(f.path) {
+			if w := expiryWarning(c, now); w != "" {
+				warnings = append(warnings, fmt.Sprintf("tls.%s %s: %s", f.key, f.path, w))
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if w := SecretFileWarning("tls.key_file", o.KeyFile); w != "" {
+		warnings = append(warnings, w)
+	}
+	for _, w := range warnings {
+		l.Warn("msg", w, "component", component, "instance_id", id)
+	}
+}
+
+// expiryWarning describes a certificate outside, or about to leave, its
+// validity window; a handshake failure is otherwise the first sign.
+func expiryWarning(c *x509.Certificate, now time.Time) string {
+	name := c.Subject.CommonName
+	switch {
+	case now.After(c.NotAfter):
+		return fmt.Sprintf("certificate %q expired on %s", name, c.NotAfter.UTC().Format(time.DateOnly))
+	case now.Before(c.NotBefore):
+		return fmt.Sprintf("certificate %q is not valid until %s", name, c.NotBefore.UTC().Format(time.DateTime))
+	case c.NotAfter.Sub(now) < expiryWindow:
+		return fmt.Sprintf("certificate %q expires on %s", name, c.NotAfter.UTC().Format(time.DateOnly))
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
+// readCerts parses every certificate in a PEM file. Constructors already
+// loaded it successfully, so an unreadable file yields nothing here.
+func readCerts(path string) []*x509.Certificate {
+	if path == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	var certs []*x509.Certificate
+	for block, rest := pem.Decode(data); block != nil; block, rest = pem.Decode(rest) {
+		if block.Type != "CERTIFICATE" {
+			continue
+		}
+		if c, err := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes); err == nil {
+			certs = append(certs, c)
+		}
+	}
+	return certs
+}
+
+// warnedSecrets keeps reloads from repeating a permission warning per path
+var warnedSecrets sync.Map
+
+// SecretFileWarning describes a secret file every local user can read, once
+// per path per process. Group access is left alone: container secret mounts
+// commonly grant it on purpose.
+func SecretFileWarning(key, path string) string {
+	if path == "" {
+		return ""
+	}
+	fi, err := os.Stat(path)
+	if err != nil || fi.Mode().Perm()&0o004 == 0 {
+		return ""
+	}
+	if _, seen := warnedSecrets.LoadOrStore(path, struct{}{}); seen {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%s %s is readable by all users (mode %04o)", key, path, fi.Mode().Perm())
+}
+
 // HTTPErrorLog adapts the structured logger for http.Server.ErrorLog so TLS
 // handshake failures don't bypass log routing straight to stderr (which would
 // violate the console sanitization policy).

internal/tlsx/tlsx_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+package tlsx
+
+import (
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"crypto/x509/pkix"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// Startup names a certificate outside its validity window or within 30 days
+// of leaving it; a healthy one stays silent.
+func TestExpiryWarning(t *testing.T) {
+	now := time.Date(2026, 10, 1, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
+	day := 24 * time.Hour
+	cert := func(from, until time.Duration) *x509.Certificate {
+		return &x509.Certificate{Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "relay"}, NotBefore: now.Add(from), NotAfter: now.Add(until)}
+	}
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name string
+		cert *x509.Certificate
+		want string
+	}{
+		{"valid", cert(-day, 90*day), ""},
+		{"expiring", cert(-day, 10*day), "expires on 2026-10-11"},
+		{"expired", cert(-90*day, -day), "expired on 2026-09-30"},
+		{"not yet valid", cert(day, 90*day), "not valid until"},
+	} {
+		got := expiryWarning(tc.cert, now)
+		if tc.want == "" && got != "" || !strings.Contains(got, tc.want) {
+			t.Errorf("%s: warning = %q, want %q", tc.name, got, tc.want)
+		}
+	}
+}