logwisp/doc/todo.md

To Do

Planned work, in order of priority. Each item names what to build, how it fits the existing seams, and how to verify it. Finished items move to the design doc they belong to.

1. Network access control (ACL)

The next feature push. Today a listener decides who a peer is (tls, auth); nothing decides where a peer may connect from, and every limit except SCRAM throttling is global. The ACL adds address rules and per-client limits at the connection level, below TLS, so a refused peer costs no handshake.

1.1 One seam: a filtering listener

• New package internal/netacl, the third network seam beside tlsx and authz (AGENTS.md lists the seams; add it there).
• netacl.New(opts *config.ACLOptions, role) (*Policy, error) compiles the block; a nil policy is valid and transparent, like authz.
• (*Policy).Listener(ln net.Listener) net.Listener wraps the raw listener before TLS:
  • TCP plugins wrap it before tls.NewListener.
  • HTTP plugins wrap it before Serve/ServeTLS.
• Accept reads an optional PROXY header (1.2), decides allow or deny (1.3), applies per-address connection caps (1.4), and returns a net.Conn whose RemoteAddr is the real client.
• Everything downstream then sees the real client with no further change: authz.remoteIP, SCRAM throttling, sessions, logs and http.Request.RemoteAddr.
• Keep the proxy's own address as peer_addr in session metadata for audit.
• A denied connection is closed before any byte is read or written, with a counter (acl_denied) and a rate-limited WARN.

1.2 PROXY protocol (deferred gap of SCRAM, see scram-auth-plan.md)

• Why: behind an L4 proxy that passes TLS through (nginx stream with ssl_preread, HAProxy mode tcp), every peer arrives from the proxy's address.
  • All peers share one SCRAM throttling budget, so one client can lock out every login.
  • Logs, sessions and the ACL itself see only the proxy.
• What: accept PROXY v1 (text) and v2 (binary) headers, but only from proxy_from addresses or CIDRs. Two config keys in the ACL block:
  • proxy_protocol = "off" | "optional" | "required", default off.
  • proxy_from = [...].
• Rules:
  • A listed peer must send the header when required.
  • An unlisted peer that sends a header is refused, since the header is spoofable.
  • The header must arrive within a short deadline (reuse tlsx.HandshakeTimeout), with a size cap: v1 at most 107 bytes, v2 with a bounded TLV length.
  • LOCAL/UNKNOWN commands (proxy health checks) keep the socket address.
  • TLVs are ignored.
• The header precedes the TLS ClientHello, so SCRAM channel binding is unaffected: LogWisp still terminates TLS.
• nginx side:
  • In the stream server, proxy_protocol on on the route to LogWisp (it sends v1).
  • HAProxy: send-proxy or send-proxy-v2.
• Relation to auth.trusted_proxies (HTTP proxy mode):
  • That list trusts X-Forwarded-For from a TLS-terminating L7 proxy; proxy_from trusts a PROXY header from an L4 proxy.
  • Keep both, with distinct names and docs. They answer different layers, and one deployment can use both: nginx stream with proxy_protocol into an nginx http block that sets X-Forwarded-For $proxy_protocol_addr.

1.3 Address rules

• allow = [CIDR...], deny = [CIDR...], IPv4 and IPv6 (strict per family, as the listeners are).
• Order: deny wins, then allow; an empty allow list admits everyone not denied.
• Rules match the real client (after PROXY), never the proxy.
  • In HTTP proxy mode, X-Forwarded-For is applied by authz.ClientAddr after the connection-level decision.
  • Address rules for forwarded HTTP clients therefore belong in a second, request-level check inside authz.ClientAddr: reuse the compiled netacl rules there rather than duplicating them.
• Startup warnings (in LogStartup style): an allow list containing 0.0.0.0/0 or ::/0, proxy_from covering public ranges, a listener on a wildcard host with no allow.

1.4 Per-client limits

• Generalize the SCRAM limiter in internal/authz/scram.go (token bucket per key, bounded table that fails closed, idle sweep, IPv6 per /64 via throttleKey) into the shared per-key limiter. One mechanism (AGENTS.md): SCRAM throttling then uses it too.
• Keys:
  • max_connections_per_client on every listener (concurrent connections per address).
  • requests_per_second_per_client on HTTP listeners (ingest, stream and status requests).
• Later: per-identity limits once a peer is authenticated (the mtls plan's deferred item 2), keyed by identity instead of address.

1.5 Config, validation, docs

• Config shape: [...config.acl] beside tls and auth on the four listener plugins.
  • Decode through config.Scan, so unknown keys fail.
  • Dialers have no ACL block.
• Intent rule as in authz: an ACL key on a dialer, or proxy_from without proxy_protocol, is an error.
• Stats: acl_denied, acl_proxy_headers, acl_limited, merged into the plugin stats like authz.Stats.
• Docs: a security.md section, plus networking.md troubleshooting lines for each refusal.

1.6 Verification

• Go tests, one per rule:
  • PROXY v1 and v2 parse, including malformed, oversized and slow headers.
  • A header from an unlisted peer refused; required without a header refused; LOCAL kept.
  • Deny over allow; IPv6 rules.
  • Per-client connection cap; the limiter table failing closed.
  • The real client reaching SCRAM throttling and session metadata.
• test/acl-test.sh:
  • A Go stub proxy that sends v1 and v2 headers in front of each listener type.
  • nginx stream with proxy_protocol on when nginx is installed.
  • Denied and allowed clients; per-client SCRAM budgets behind one proxy address.

2. Flush network sinks at shutdown

At the end of a finite input lw shuts down, and the http and tcp sinks disconnect their clients without writing the entries still queued for them, so a client can miss the last ones. On Stop, each sink's broker should first move its input queue into the client queues, then let every client writer drain its queue within a bound (write_timeout_ms) before the disconnect frame. Verify with a finite stdin into each sink and a connected client counting lines.

3. Hardening review of lixenwraith/config and lixenwraith/toml

Both parse untrusted-shaped input (config files, environment, command line) and were not reviewed with the auth work. Review them as auth was reviewed: adversarial lenses, reproduction before belief, a fix per confirmed finding in the library repository, then a dependency bump here.

• toml parser:
  • Limits on nesting depth, key count, string and array length, and number sizes.
  • Behaviour on invalid UTF-8, duplicate keys and tables, dotted-key and inline-table redefinition.
  • Fuzz targets (go test -fuzz) seeded with the TOML test suite.
• config:
  • The weakly typed decoder: string-to-number overflow, duration and size parsing, the comma split into slices.
  • maxValueDepth and MaxValueSize, environment and CLI precedence, and unknown-key reporting.
• Files:
  • PreventPathTraversal, symlink handling and the file-size cap.
  • The watcher: polling, debounce, a file replaced by rename or symlink swap, TOCTOU between stat and read.
• Errors: values must never echo secrets (a misplaced password in a config value reported back in an error).
• Deliverables:
  • Findings per library.
  • Fuzz targets committed in the library repositories.
  • A note in this repository's security.md once done.

4. Packaging: AUR, FreeBSD ports, Debian

The foundation exists:

• The lw binary name, free in Arch (official repositories and AUR), Ubuntu 24.04 and 26.04, and the FreeBSD 15.1 ports tree.
• The canonical module path github.com/lixenwraith/logwisp, which go install, FreeBSD's USES=go:modules and Debian's dh-golang expect.
• make install with DESTDIR, PREFIX and SYSCONFDIR.
• The doc/lw.1 manual.
• Service files in deploy/package/: systemd unit, sysusers, tmpfiles and the FreeBSD rc.d script.
• Skeletons in deploy/package/arch/ and deploy/package/freebsd/.

What remains. Steps 1 to 3 are the maintainer's: they need push rights and an identity, and both skeletons download the tagged source.

1. Tag the release on the merged main commit, vX.Y.Z:

   git tag -a vX.Y.Z -m vX.Y.Z      # git tag -s signs it with your key
   git push origin vX.Y.Z
   

   • make then stamps vX.Y.Z (from git describe), and go install github.com/lixenwraith/logwisp/cmd/lw@vX.Y.Z works.
   • A GitHub release for the tag is optional; the tag alone serves archive/vX.Y.Z.tar.gz, which the PKGBUILD downloads.
2. Arch (AUR), deploy/package/arch/PKGBUILD:
   • pkgver=X.Y.Z and the # Maintainer: Name <email> line.
   • updpkgsums (pacman-contrib) replaces sha256sums=('SKIP') with the tarball's checksum.
   • namcap PKGBUILD, then makepkg -si (builds, runs check(), installs), then makepkg --printsrcinfo > .SRCINFO.
   • Push PKGBUILD and .SRCINFO to ssh://aur@aur.archlinux.org/logwisp.git; optionally a logwisp-git package built from the main branch.
3. FreeBSD, deploy/package/freebsd/ (sysutils/logwisp):
   • DISTVERSION=X.Y.Z and MAINTAINER= your address.
   • make makesum writes distinfo: the module zip that the Go proxy serves for GO_MODULE at the tag.
   • The logwisp user needs an ID registered in the ports tree. Take a number below 1000 that is free in both /usr/ports/UIDs and /usr/ports/GIDs, and add to the same patch:

     UIDs: logwisp:*:NNN:NNN::0:0:LogWisp daemon:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
     GIDs: logwisp:*:NNN:
     

   • portlint -AC, poudriere testport on 14.x and 15.x jails, then a Bugzilla report with the port directory and the UIDs/GIDs diff.
4. Debian:
   • Debian policy wants every Go dependency packaged; the four lixenwraith libraries are not.
   • Either package them too (dh-golang), or start with an .deb built by the Makefile install target (nfpm or dpkg-deb) and a PPA, and move to the archive later.
5. Shell completion for bash, zsh and fish, installed by make install.
6. A packaging CI job: build the AUR package in an Arch container and the port in a FreeBSD VM, run lw --version and make image-check.