logwisp/doc/sources.md

Input Sources

Sources produce core.LogEntry values for a pipeline. Every source is declared as a [[pipelines.plugin_sources]] entry with an id, a type, and a type-specific config table.

[[pipelines.plugin_sources]]
id   = "app_logs"
type = "file"
[pipelines.plugin_sources.config]
directory = "/var/log/myapp"

Registered types: file, console, random, null, tcp_chain, http_chain.

Publication from any source is non-blocking. When a subscriber channel is full the entry is dropped and counted in dropped_entries.

---

file

Tails every file in a directory whose name matches a glob.

[[pipelines.plugin_sources]]
id   = "app_logs"
type = "file"
[pipelines.plugin_sources.config]
directory         = "/var/log/myapp"
pattern           = "*.log"
check_interval_ms = 100
raw               = false
from              = "end"

Options, each as type and default:

• directory (string, required): directory to scan; not recursive.
• pattern (string, *): glob over filenames; * and ? only.
• check_interval_ms (int, 100): directory rescan interval; minimum 10.
• raw (bool, false): never parse a line: the whole line is the message.
• from (string, end): where a new watcher starts, end or start of the file.

Behaviour

• check_interval_ms governs how often the directory is rescanned for new or removed files. Tailing an already-open file polls on a fixed 100 ms interval that this option does not change.
• Each matched file gets its own watcher. Watchers for files that disappear are stopped and removed on the next scan.
• A new watcher seeks to end-of-file. Positions live in memory only, so a restart resumes from the current end of each file and content written while LogWisp was down is not read. from = "start" reads each file whole when its watcher is created instead — what a process writing beside LogWisp needs, at the cost of replaying a file already on disk at every restart.
• Rotation is detected from size decrease, modification-time reset, a position beyond end-of-file, or an inode change. An inode change where the new file is already larger than the recorded position is treated as an atomic save, not a rotation, and the position is preserved.
• A rotation that renames in place — what a size-capped writer does — puts the same inode back under a name pattern also matches. Its watcher resumes at the position the original reached, so from = "start" reads the tail an unfinished read left behind rather than the whole archive a second time.
• A line is parsed as JSON only when it is an object whose top-level keys are all drawn from time, level, msg and fields — the four an entry can carry. time is read as RFC3339Nano. Any other key, and any non-object line, is kept whole as text with the level inferred from common markers ([ERROR], WARN:, and so on), because parsing it would drop the rest.
• raw = true skips the JSON branch entirely. The line, plus its newline, becomes the message; fields stays empty, the time is the read time, and the level is inferred from the text as for any unparsed line. Paired with format.type = "raw" this is byte-exact transport for records LogWisp's envelope cannot hold — see Formatters.
• Source is set to the file's base name.

Statistics: per-watcher size, position, entries read, rotation count, and last read time, plus active_watchers.

---

console

Reads newline-delimited entries from standard input.

[[pipelines.plugin_sources]]
id   = "stdin"
type = "console"
[pipelines.plugin_sources.config]
buffer_size = 1000

Option, as type and default:

• buffer_size (int, 1000): subscriber channel depth.

At most one instance per pipeline: the type is registered with MaxInstances: 1, and a second instance is rejected at pipeline construction. The level is inferred from the line text, and Source is set to console.

---

random

Synthetic entry generator for development, smoke tests, and sanitizer testing.

[[pipelines.plugin_sources]]
id   = "generator"
type = "random"
[pipelines.plugin_sources.config]
interval_ms = 500
jitter_ms   = 0
format      = "txt"
length      = 20
special     = false

Options, each as type and default:

• interval_ms (int, 500): emission period.
• jitter_ms (int, 0): symmetric jitter; must be non-negative, clamped to interval_ms.
• format (string, txt): raw (message only), txt (bracketed line) or json (JSON object as the message).
• length (int, 20): message length in characters.
• special (bool, false): inject control and non-ASCII characters.

special = true is the intended way to exercise sanitizer policies: it inserts control bytes and multi-byte Unicode into otherwise ordinary messages. Levels are chosen at random from DEBUG, INFO, WARN, ERROR.

---

null

Produces nothing. Useful as a placeholder so a sink-only pipeline satisfies the "at least one source" requirement.

[[pipelines.plugin_sources]]
id   = "void"
type = "null"

No options.

---

tcp_chain

Listens for persistent NDJSON streams from upstream LogWisp tcp_chain sinks. See Chaining for the protocol.

[[pipelines.plugin_sources]]
id   = "ingest_tcp"
type = "tcp_chain"
[pipelines.plugin_sources.config]
host             = "0.0.0.0"
port             = 15801
buffer_size      = 1000
max_connections  = 0
read_timeout_ms  = 0
hello_timeout_ms = 10000
trust_node       = true

[pipelines.plugin_sources.config.tls]
enabled        = true
cert_file      = "/etc/logwisp/tls/server.crt"
key_file       = "/etc/logwisp/tls/server.key"
client_auth    = true
client_ca_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/client-ca.crt"
min_version    = "1.3"

[pipelines.plugin_sources.config.auth]
type         = "mtls"
allow        = ["edge-01", "edge-02"]
node_binding = "force"

Options, each as type and default:

• host (string, 0.0.0.0): bind address, IPv4 or IPv6 (::); the listener keeps to its family (Networking).
• port (int, required): listen port, 1–65535.
• buffer_size (int, 1000): subscriber channel depth.
• max_connections (int, 0): concurrent connection cap; 0 = unlimited.
• read_timeout_ms (int, 0): per-connection idle read deadline; 0 = none.
• hello_timeout_ms (int, 10000): deadline for the hello preamble.
• trust_node (bool, true): false overrides the sender's node label with its remote address. auth.node_binding assert or force takes over the connection label; only force also overrides the per-entry labels; none leaves both to trust_node.
• tls (table): listener TLS; see Security.
• auth (table): peer authentication (mtls or scram) and node binding; see Security.

For passwords instead of certificates, the auth block takes type = "scram" and a credentials_file, and client_auth becomes optional; see Password Authentication.

Behaviour

• TLS handshakes run explicitly with a 10 s bound before the preamble is read, after the max_connections admission check.
• A connection is rejected if the first line is not a valid hello with a matching protocol version.
• Under mtls the certificate is checked before the hello is read, so an unauthorized peer never gets a preamble parsed on its behalf. Under scram the hello opens the login: challenge, proof and final follow on the same connection, the whole exchange within hello_timeout_ms, and the final is sent only once node binding agrees. A source without scram answers a hello offering credentials with authentication not enabled. A rejection is logged at WARN and counted in rejected_conns.
• The node label is then resolved: under auth.node_binding it comes from the peer's certificate identity or username, otherwise trust_node governs. force also overrides the node field on every individual entry; assert leaves per-entry labels to trust_node, so a relay can forward other nodes' entries while proving its own identity.
• Each accepted connection gets a session recording the remote address, node label, — under TLS — tls and tls_peer_cn, and — under auth — auth_method and auth_identity.
• A malformed entry line increments parse_errors and is skipped; the connection survives. A line over 1 MiB is a protocol violation and terminates the connection.

Statistics: active_connections, rejected_conns, parse_errors, tls_handshake_errors, trust_node, auth, auth_allowed, auth_rejected, node_binding; under scram also auth_users, auth_throttled, auth_busy and auth_binding_mismatch.

---

http_chain

Accepts NDJSON batches POSTed by upstream LogWisp http_chain sinks.

[[pipelines.plugin_sources]]
id   = "ingest_http"
type = "http_chain"
[pipelines.plugin_sources.config]
host            = "0.0.0.0"
port            = 15802
ingest_path     = "/ingest"
buffer_size     = 1000
max_body_bytes  = 8388608
read_timeout_ms = 30000
trust_node      = true

[pipelines.plugin_sources.config.tls]
enabled        = true
cert_file      = "/etc/logwisp/tls/server.crt"
key_file       = "/etc/logwisp/tls/server.key"
client_auth    = true
client_ca_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/client-ca.crt"

[pipelines.plugin_sources.config.auth]
type         = "mtls"
allow        = ["edge-01", "edge-02"]
node_binding = "force"

Options, each as type and default:

• host (string, 0.0.0.0): bind address, IPv4 or IPv6 (::); the listener keeps to its family (Networking).
• port (int, required): listen port, 1–65535.
• ingest_path (string, /ingest): endpoint path; must start with /, and /auth is reserved for the login.
• buffer_size (int, 1000): subscriber channel depth.
• max_body_bytes (int, 8388608): per-request body cap (8 MiB).
• read_timeout_ms (int, 30000): full request read deadline.
• trust_node (bool, true): false overrides the sender's node label with its remote address. auth.node_binding assert or force takes over the connection label; only force also overrides the per-entry labels; none leaves both to trust_node.
• tls (table): listener TLS; see Security.
• auth (table): peer authentication (mtls or scram) and node binding; see Security.

Behaviour

• Only POST to ingest_path and to /auth is routed; other methods get 405 with an Allow header, and other paths get 404. /auth is the SCRAM login and answers 404 unless auth.type = "scram".
• Authorization runs before the body is read, so an unauthorized sender does not get to stream max_body_bytes into the process. A missing, invalid or expired bearer token (scram) answers 401, so the sender logs in again; a refused certificate, a certificate that does not match the token's user, and a node-binding failure answer 403. Both are distinct from the 400 used for protocol errors, so a sender can tell "not allowed" from "malformed batch".
• A missing or mismatched X-Logwisp-Protocol header is rejected with 400.
• Batch acceptance is atomic: entries are published only after the body reads cleanly end to end. A transfer error rejects the whole batch (400, or 413 when the body cap is hit) so the sender retries it. A malformed line inside an otherwise clean transfer is skipped and counted in parse_errors.
• Success is 204 No Content with X-Logwisp-Accepted set to the number of entries ingested.
• Sessions are cached per remote host + node + authenticated identity, and recreated after idle expiry. Including the identity in the key means two peers sharing a remote address never share a session.

Statistics: total_requests, rejected_requests, parse_errors, cached_sessions, trust_node, auth, auth_allowed, auth_rejected, node_binding; under scram also auth_users, auth_throttled, auth_busy, auth_binding_mismatch and auth_token_lifetime_ms.

---

Source Statistics

Every source reports: id, type, total_entries, dropped_entries, start_time, last_entry_time, and a type-specific details map. The DEBUG status report spreads details into each plugin's line.