9.1 KiB
Chaining
Chaining links LogWisp nodes together. An edge node forwards its entries to a
relay or collector, which can filter, reformat, fan out, or forward them again.
Unlike the tcp and http sinks — which emit formatted text for humans and
generic clients — chain links carry the structured entry, so downstream
nodes can filter and reformat as if the entries were local.
Topology
edge-01 relay consumers
┌───────────────┐ ┌────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
│ file source │ │ tcp_chain source │ │ browser (SSE)│
│ ↓ │ TCP/TLS │ ↓ │ ───► │ nc / telnet │
│ tcp_chain sink├────────────►│ flow │ │ archive file │
└───────────────┘ :15801 │ ↓ │ └──────────────┘
│ http sink, tcp sink│
edge-02 │ file sink │
┌───────────────┐ │ http_chain sink ───┼──► upstream collector
│ file source │ HTTP/TLS │ │
│ ↓ ├────────────►│ http_chain source │
│ http_chain sink│ :15802 └────────────────────┘
└───────────────┘
Both chain sources can feed a single pipeline (fan-in) whose sinks then fan the
merged stream out. test/chain-test.sh builds the two-independent-pipelines
variant; test/chain-aggregate-test.sh builds the fan-in variant.
Node Identity
Chained entries carry a node label identifying where they originated.
- A chain sink stamps
nodeon any entry that does not already have one. The label comes from thenodeoption, defaulting toos.Hostname(). - A chain source either honours the sender's label or overrides it,
according to
trust_node:
trust_node |
Behaviour |
|---|---|
true (default) |
Keep the label the sender declared; fall back to the remote address when absent |
false |
Always overwrite with the sender's remote address |
Relays preserve node, so a label survives any number of hops and identifies
the original producer rather than the last relay.
Under mTLS the source can instead bind the label to the sender's certificate,
which overrides trust_node entirely:
auth.node_binding |
Connection label | Per-entry node field |
|---|---|---|
none |
trust_node governs |
trust_node governs |
assert |
Must equal the certificate identity, or the peer is rejected | trust_node governs |
force (default under mtls) |
The certificate identity | Overwritten with the identity |
Pick force at an ingest boundary you do not trust — it is the only setting
where a compromised edge cannot mislabel its entries, including through the
per-entry node field. Pick assert on a relay-to-relay hop, where the relay
should prove its own identity but the origin labels it forwards must survive.
See Security.
Formatters render node identity as a syslog-style prefix on the source field:
edge-01/app.log. In JSON output the node therefore appears inside the source
field, not as a separate top-level key.
trust_node = truewith noauthblock means any peer the CA vouches for can claim any node label, including one belonging to another host. On an untrusted network setauth.type = "mtls"withnode_binding = "force";trust_node = falseis the fallback when certificates are not an option.
Wire Protocol
Protocol version: 1. Both transports carry the same canonical entry encoding, and differ only in how the preamble and framing are expressed.
TCP transport
A persistent connection carrying newline-delimited JSON.
-
The dialer connects and, under TLS, completes the handshake.
-
The dialer immediately writes the hello preamble as one JSON line:
{"logwisp":1,"node":"edge-01"} -
The listener reads that line within
hello_timeout_msand rejects the connection if it is malformed or declares a different protocol version. -
Every subsequent line is one JSON-encoded
LogEntry.
Line size is bounded at 1 MiB. An oversized line is a protocol violation and terminates the connection, because the scanner cannot resynchronize afterwards.
HTTP transport
Batches of NDJSON delivered by POST, with the preamble expressed as headers.
| Header | Direction | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
X-Logwisp-Protocol |
request | Protocol version; must be 1 |
X-Logwisp-Node |
request | Origin node label |
Content-Type |
request | application/x-ndjson |
X-Logwisp-Accepted |
response | Number of entries ingested |
Responses: 204 on success, 400 for a bad protocol version or a malformed
body, 413 when the body cap is exceeded, 405 for a non-POST method.
Entry encoding
{
"time": "2026-01-02T15:04:05.123456789Z",
"node": "edge-01",
"source": "app.log",
"level": "ERROR",
"message": "connection refused",
"fields": {"attempt": 3}
}
node, level, and fields are omitted when empty. A missing time is filled
in at ingest.
Delivery Semantics
| Transport | Guarantee | Failure behaviour |
|---|---|---|
tcp_chain |
Per-line, held across reconnects | Retries with exponential backoff plus ±20 % jitter until written or shutdown; back-pressure appears upstream as total_dropped_by_sink |
http_chain |
At-least-once per batch | Retries transport errors, 408, 429, 5xx; drops on any other non-2xx (dropped_batches) |
http_chain batches can be delivered twice when a successful request's response
is lost. There is no de-duplication downstream; design your consumers to
tolerate it, or use tcp_chain where each line is written once per successful
write.
Neither transport persists anything to disk. Entries buffered in memory during an outage are lost if the process exits.
Worked Example
Edge node — tail files, forward over mTLS:
[[pipelines]]
name = "edge"
[[pipelines.plugin_sources]]
id = "app"
type = "file"
[pipelines.plugin_sources.config]
directory = "/var/log/myapp"
pattern = "*.log"
[[pipelines.plugin_sinks]]
id = "forward"
type = "tcp_chain"
[pipelines.plugin_sinks.config]
host = "relay.internal"
port = 15801
node = "edge-01"
[pipelines.plugin_sinks.config.tls]
enabled = true
ca_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/ca.crt"
cert_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/edge-01.crt"
key_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/edge-01.key"
[pipelines.plugin_sinks.config.auth]
type = "mtls"
allow = ["relay.internal"] # pin the relay, not just its hostname
Relay — ingest, keep errors only, archive and stream:
[[pipelines]]
name = "relay"
[[pipelines.flow.filters]]
type = "include"
patterns = ["ERROR", "FATAL"]
[pipelines.flow.format]
type = "json"
sanitizer_policy = "json"
[[pipelines.plugin_sources]]
id = "ingest"
type = "tcp_chain"
[pipelines.plugin_sources.config]
host = "0.0.0.0"
port = 15801
[pipelines.plugin_sources.config.tls]
enabled = true
cert_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/relay.crt"
key_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/relay.key"
client_auth = true
client_ca_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/ca.crt"
[pipelines.plugin_sources.config.auth]
type = "mtls"
allow = ["edge-01", "edge-02"]
node_binding = "force" # entries are labelled from the certificate
[[pipelines.plugin_sinks]]
id = "archive"
type = "file"
[pipelines.plugin_sinks.config]
directory = "/var/log/logwisp"
name = "errors"
[[pipelines.plugin_sinks]]
id = "live"
type = "http"
[pipelines.plugin_sinks.config]
host = "127.0.0.1"
port = 8080
Entries arriving on this relay are labelled edge-01 or edge-02 because that
is what their certificates say, regardless of the node each edge configured.
test/mtls-chain-test.sh builds exactly this shape against a throwaway PKI.
Operational Notes
- Formatting is a relay decision. Because chain links carry structured
entries, the edge node's
flow.formataffects only its own local sinks. Set the output shape on the node that owns the human-facing sink. - Filtering early saves bandwidth. A filter on the edge drops entries before they cross the network; a filter on the relay is easier to change centrally.
- Rate limits are per pipeline. An edge limit protects the link; a relay limit protects the relay from a noisy edge.
- Heartbeats traverse chain links as ordinary structured entries and keep otherwise-idle links and their sessions warm.
- Ports used by the bundled test scripts:
15801tcp_chain ingest,15802http_chain ingest,15803tcp sink,15804http sink. - Use
127.0.0.1, notlocalhost, when testing locally: all listeners and dialers are IPv4-only, andlocalhostmay resolve to::1.