Files
logwisp/doc/sources.md
T
lixen f4f8cc0986
Package / arch (push) Canceled after 0s
Package / user (push) Canceled after 0s
Package / deb (push) Canceled after 0s
Package / freebsd (push) Canceled after 0s
Package / image (push) Canceled after 0s
Test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
Test / e2e (push) Canceled after 0s
v0.35.0 tui fixes
2026-10-11 04:11:57 -04:00

14 KiB
Raw Blame History

Input Sources

Sources produce core.LogEntry values for a pipeline. Every source is declared as a [[pipelines.plugin_sources]] entry with an id, a type, and a type-specific config table. Registered types: file, console, random, null, tcp_chain, http_chain.

Publication is non-blocking for every source but console: a full subscriber channel drops the entry and counts it in dropped_entries. The console source waits instead (see console).


file

Tails every file in a directory whose name matches a glob.

[[pipelines.plugin_sources]]
id   = "app_logs"
type = "file"
[pipelines.plugin_sources.config]
directory         = "/var/log/myapp"
pattern           = "*.log"
check_interval_ms = 100
raw               = false
from              = "end"

Options, each as type and default:

  • directory (string, required): directory to scan; not recursive. A leading ~/, here as in every file or directory option, is the home directory; a relative path starts at lw's working directory; a missing one is waited for.
  • pattern (string, *): glob over filenames; * and ? only.
  • check_interval_ms (int, 100): directory rescan interval; minimum 10. An open file is polled every 100 ms whatever this is.
  • raw (bool, false): never parse a line: the whole line is the message.
  • from (string, end): where a new watcher starts, end or start of the file.

Behaviour

  • Each matched file gets its own watcher, and its entries the file's base name as Source. Watchers for files that disappear are stopped and removed on the next scan.
  • The file lw's stdout or stderr is redirected to is never followed, with a warning: lw > out.log in the directory would read its own output back.
  • A line longer than 1 MiB continues in the next entry, as on the console source.
  • A new watcher seeks to end-of-file. Positions live in memory only, so a restart or a reload resumes from the current end of each file, and content written meanwhile is not read. from = "start" instead reads each file whole when its watcher is created, which a process writing beside LogWisp needs, at the cost of replaying files already on disk at every restart and reload.
  • Rotation is detected from size decrease, modification-time reset, a position beyond end-of-file, or an inode change. An inode change where the new file is at least as large as the recorded position is treated as an atomic save, not a rotation, and the position is preserved. Each rotation also publishes an INFO entry Log rotation detected (#N): REASON with the file's name as Source; it reaches every sink, so exclude it with a filter (Log rotation detected) where unwanted.
  • A rotation that renames in place — what a size-capped writer does — puts the same inode back under a name pattern also matches. Its watcher resumes at the position the original reached, so from = "start" reads the tail an unfinished read left behind rather than the whole archive a second time.
  • A line is parsed as JSON only when it is an object whose top-level keys are all drawn from time, level, msg and fields — the four an entry can carry. time is read as RFC3339Nano. Any other key, and any non-object line, is kept whole as text, because parsing it would drop the rest. level is kept as written (a filter sees Error or fatal as is), and a line without level has none; only text lines get the inference below.
  • A text line's level is its first whole word, in any case, naming one: TRACE; DEBUG, DBG; INFO, INF; WARN, WARNING; ERROR, ERR, FATAL. warning: disk full is WARN, INFO retry after error INFO. The console sink paints that word and the http sink's viewer filters on it.
  • raw = true skips the JSON branch. The line, with its terminator (\n or \r\n) removed, becomes the message. fields stays empty, the time is the read time, and the level is inferred from the text. Blank lines are skipped. With format.type = "raw" each line is written back with one \n, which carries records the envelope cannot hold but is not byte-exact; see Formatters.

Statistics: per-watcher size, position, entries read, rotation count, and last read time, plus active_watchers.


console

Reads newline-delimited entries from standard input. It is the source of the built-in pipe pipeline, and of every spec pipeline given no --source.

[[pipelines.plugin_sources]]
id   = "console"
type = "console"
[pipelines.plugin_sources.config]
buffer_size = 1000

Option, as type and default:

  • buffer_size (int, 1000): subscriber channel depth.

Lines:

  • Each line is one entry, its terminator (\n or \r\n) removed; the formatter writes one back. An unterminated last line is kept.
  • Blank lines are skipped.
  • A line over 1 MiB continues in the next entry; no byte is lost.
  • The level is inferred from the line text, and Source is set to console.

Delivery and lifetime:

  • Nothing is dropped: the source waits for its pipeline, so a slow pipeline slows the reading of stdin.
  • One reader serves the process. A reload's new source continues where the old one stopped; no line is read twice. Hence at most one console source in the whole configuration, checked at validation.
  • At the end of input the source ends, and with it a pipeline whose sources have all ended; lw exits once every pipeline has (CLI). Under a supervisor whose stdin is /dev/null that is at once.

random

Generated entries, to check a deployment before real logs are wired: paths, permissions, sinks, chains, and sanitizer policies with special = true.

[[pipelines.plugin_sources]]
id   = "generator"
type = "random"
[pipelines.plugin_sources.config]
interval_ms = 500
jitter_ms   = 0
format      = "txt"
length      = 20
special     = false

Options, each as type and default:

  • interval_ms (int, 500): emission period.
  • jitter_ms (int, 0): each interval varies by up to ±jitter_ms/2; non-negative, capped at interval_ms.
  • format (string, txt): raw (message only), txt (bracketed line) or json (JSON object as the message).
  • length (int, 20): bytes of random text; txt and json wrap it in a longer message.
  • special (bool, false): with length ≥ 3, mix in up to one control byte (\n and \r among them) and a few non-ASCII bytes, often invalid UTF-8. raw and txt carry them as they are; json escapes them inside its message.

Levels (txt and json only) are random among DEBUG, INFO, WARN, ERROR.


null

Nothing; holds a source's place until one is chosen, so a pipeline can be set up, sinks first, before its source is.

[[pipelines.plugin_sources]]
id   = "void"
type = "null"

No options.


tcp_chain

Listens for persistent NDJSON streams from upstream LogWisp tcp_chain sinks. See Chaining for the protocol.

[[pipelines.plugin_sources]]
id   = "ingest_tcp"
type = "tcp_chain"
[pipelines.plugin_sources.config]
host             = "0.0.0.0"
port             = 15801
buffer_size      = 1000
max_connections  = 0
read_timeout_ms  = 0
hello_timeout_ms = 10000
trust_node       = true

[pipelines.plugin_sources.config.tls]
enabled        = true
cert_file      = "/etc/logwisp/tls/server.crt"
key_file       = "/etc/logwisp/tls/server.key"
client_auth    = true
client_ca_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/client-ca.crt"
min_version    = "1.3"

[pipelines.plugin_sources.config.auth]
type         = "mtls"
allow        = ["edge-01", "edge-02"]
node_binding = "force"

Options, each as type and default:

  • host (string, 0.0.0.0): bind address, IPv4 or IPv6 (::); the listener keeps to its family (Networking).
  • port (int, required): listen port, 1–65535.
  • buffer_size (int, 1000): subscriber channel depth.
  • max_connections (int, 0): concurrent connection cap; 0 = unlimited.
  • read_timeout_ms (int, 0): per-connection idle read deadline; 0 = none.
  • hello_timeout_ms (int, 10000): deadline for the hello preamble.
  • trust_node (bool, true): false overrides the sender's node label with its remote address. auth.node_binding assert or force takes over the connection label, and force the per-entry labels too (Chaining).
  • tls (table): listener TLS; see Security.
  • auth (table): peer authentication (mtls or scram) and node binding; see Security.
  • acl (table): allow and deny, addresses or CIDRs admitted and refused before TLS, proxy_protocol with proxy_from for the client a PROXY header names, and max_connections_per_client; see Security.

For passwords instead of certificates, the auth block takes type = "scram" and a credentials_file, or one username with its password_file, and client_auth becomes optional; see Password Authentication.

Behaviour

  • TLS handshakes run explicitly with a 10 s bound before the preamble is read, after the max_connections admission check.
  • Under mtls the certificate is checked before the hello is read, so an unauthorized peer never gets a preamble parsed on its behalf. Under scram the hello opens the login: challenge, proof and final follow on the same connection, the whole exchange within hello_timeout_ms, and the final is sent only once node binding agrees. A source without scram answers a hello offering credentials with authentication not enabled.
  • An auth or node-binding refusal is logged at WARN and counted in rejected_conns. A missing, malformed or wrong-version hello is logged at WARN (Rejected chain connection) and not counted in rejected_conns; under scram a malformed or wrong-version one counts in auth_rejected. A connection over max_connections is closed and counted without a log.
  • The node label is then resolved by trust_node and auth.node_binding (see Chaining).
  • Each accepted connection gets a session recording its remote address and:
    • node, the resolved label
    • under TLS: tls, tls_peer_cn
    • under auth: auth_method, auth_identity
    • behind a PROXY header: the proxy as peer_addr
  • A malformed entry line increments parse_errors and is skipped; the connection survives. A line over 1 MiB is a protocol violation and terminates the connection.

Statistics: host, port, tls, active_connections, rejected_conns, parse_errors, tls_handshake_errors, trust_node, and the auth and acl keys.


http_chain

Accepts NDJSON batches POSTed by upstream LogWisp http_chain sinks.

[[pipelines.plugin_sources]]
id   = "ingest_http"
type = "http_chain"
[pipelines.plugin_sources.config]
host            = "0.0.0.0"
port            = 15802
ingest_path     = "/ingest"
buffer_size     = 1000
max_body_bytes  = 8388608
read_timeout_ms = 30000
trust_node      = true

[pipelines.plugin_sources.config.tls]
enabled        = true
cert_file      = "/etc/logwisp/tls/server.crt"
key_file       = "/etc/logwisp/tls/server.key"
client_auth    = true
client_ca_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/client-ca.crt"

[pipelines.plugin_sources.config.auth]
type         = "mtls"
allow        = ["edge-01", "edge-02"]
node_binding = "force"

Options, each as type and default:

  • host, port, trust_node, tls, auth: as on tcp_chain.
  • ingest_path (string, /ingest): endpoint path; must start with /, and /auth is reserved for the login.
  • buffer_size (int, 1000): subscriber channel depth.
  • max_body_bytes (int, 8388608): per-request body cap (8 MiB).
  • read_timeout_ms (int, 30000): full request read deadline.
  • acl (table): as on tcp_chain, plus requests_per_second_per_client.

Behaviour

  • Only POST to ingest_path and to /auth is routed; other methods get 405 with an Allow header, and other paths get 404. /auth is the SCRAM login and answers 404 unless auth.type = "scram".
  • Authorization runs before the body is read, so an unauthorized sender does not get to stream max_body_bytes into the process. A missing, invalid or expired bearer token (scram) answers 401, so the sender logs in again; a refused certificate, a certificate that does not match the token's user, and a node-binding failure answer 403. Both are distinct from the 400 used for protocol errors, so a sender can tell "not allowed" from "malformed batch".
  • A missing or mismatched X-Logwisp-Protocol header is rejected with 400.
  • With acl.requests_per_second_per_client, a request over the rate gets 429 with Retry-After; the sink retries it.
  • Batch acceptance is atomic: entries are published only after the body reads cleanly end to end. A transfer error, a line over 1 MiB included, rejects the whole batch with 400, or 413 when the body cap is hit; an http_chain sink drops such a batch (dropped_batches) rather than retry it. A malformed line inside an otherwise clean transfer is skipped and counted in parse_errors.
  • Success is 204 No Content with X-Logwisp-Accepted set to the number of entries ingested.
  • Sessions are cached per remote host + node + authenticated identity, and recreated after idle expiry. Including the identity in the key means two peers sharing a remote address never share a session.

Statistics: host, port, ingest_path, tls, total_requests, rejected_requests, parse_errors, cached_sessions, trust_node, and the auth and acl keys.


Source Statistics

Every source reports: id, type, total_entries, dropped_entries, start_time, last_entry_time, and a type-specific details map. The DEBUG status report spreads details into each plugin's line.

Network sources and sinks add the auth and acl keys to details:

  • auth: the method, none without an auth block; with one also
    • auth_allowed, auth_rejected; chain sources node_binding
    • mtls: auth_identity, auth_unrestricted
    • scram listeners: auth_users, auth_throttled, auth_busy, auth_binding_mismatch, auth_identity when bound; on HTTP auth_token_lifetime_ms; in proxy mode auth_trusted_proxies
    • scram dialers: auth_username, auth_failures, last_auth_error
  • with a non-empty acl block: acl, acl_denied, acl_limited, acl_proxy_headers