14 KiB
Input Sources
Sources produce core.LogEntry values for a pipeline. Every source is declared
as a [[pipelines.plugin_sources]] entry with an id, a type, and a
type-specific config table. Registered types: file, console, random,
null, tcp_chain, http_chain.
Publication is non-blocking for every source but console: a full subscriber
channel drops the entry and counts it in dropped_entries. The console
source waits instead (see console).
file
Tails every file in a directory whose name matches a glob.
[[pipelines.plugin_sources]]
id = "app_logs"
type = "file"
[pipelines.plugin_sources.config]
directory = "/var/log/myapp"
pattern = "*.log"
check_interval_ms = 100
raw = false
from = "end"
Options, each as type and default:
directory(string, required): directory to scan; not recursive. A leading~/, here as in every file or directory option, is the home directory; a relative path starts at lw's working directory; a missing one is waited for.pattern(string,*): glob over filenames;*and?only.check_interval_ms(int,100): directory rescan interval; minimum10. An open file is polled every 100 ms whatever this is.raw(bool,false): never parse a line: the whole line is the message.from(string,end): where a new watcher starts,endorstartof the file.
Behaviour
- Each matched file gets its own watcher, and its entries the file's base
name as
Source. Watchers for files that disappear are stopped and removed on the next scan. - The file lw's stdout or stderr is redirected to is never followed, with a
warning:
lw > out.login the directory would read its own output back. - A line longer than 1 MiB continues in the next entry, as on the console source.
- A new watcher seeks to end-of-file. Positions live in memory only, so a
restart or a reload resumes from the current end of each file, and content
written meanwhile is not read.
from = "start"instead reads each file whole when its watcher is created, which a process writing beside LogWisp needs, at the cost of replaying files already on disk at every restart and reload. - Rotation is detected from size decrease, modification-time reset, a position
beyond end-of-file, or an inode change. An inode change where the new file is
at least as large as the recorded position is treated as an atomic save, not
a rotation, and the position is preserved. Each rotation also publishes an
INFO entry
Log rotation detected (#N): REASONwith the file's name asSource; it reaches every sink, so exclude it with a filter (Log rotation detected) where unwanted. - A rotation that renames in place — what a size-capped writer does — puts the
same inode back under a name
patternalso matches. Its watcher resumes at the position the original reached, sofrom = "start"reads the tail an unfinished read left behind rather than the whole archive a second time. - A line is parsed as JSON only when it is an object whose top-level keys are
all drawn from
time,level,msgandfields— the four an entry can carry.timeis read as RFC3339Nano. Any other key, and any non-object line, is kept whole as text, because parsing it would drop the rest.levelis kept as written (a filter seesErrororfatalas is), and a line withoutlevelhas none; only text lines get the inference below. - A text line's level is its first whole word, in any case, naming one:
TRACE;DEBUG,DBG;INFO,INF;WARN,WARNING;ERROR,ERR,FATAL.warning: disk fullis WARN,INFO retry after errorINFO. The console sink paints that word and the http sink's viewer filters on it. raw = trueskips the JSON branch. The line, with its terminator (\nor\r\n) removed, becomes the message.fieldsstays empty, the time is the read time, and the level is inferred from the text. Blank lines are skipped. Withformat.type = "raw"each line is written back with one\n, which carries records the envelope cannot hold but is not byte-exact; see Formatters.
Statistics: per-watcher size, position, entries read, rotation count, and
last read time, plus active_watchers.
console
Reads newline-delimited entries from standard input. It is the source of the
built-in pipe pipeline, and of every spec pipeline given no --source.
[[pipelines.plugin_sources]]
id = "console"
type = "console"
[pipelines.plugin_sources.config]
buffer_size = 1000
Option, as type and default:
buffer_size(int,1000): subscriber channel depth.
Lines:
- Each line is one entry, its terminator (
\nor\r\n) removed; the formatter writes one back. An unterminated last line is kept. - Blank lines are skipped.
- A line over 1 MiB continues in the next entry; no byte is lost.
- The level is inferred from the line text, and
Sourceis set toconsole.
Delivery and lifetime:
- Nothing is dropped: the source waits for its pipeline, so a slow pipeline slows the reading of stdin.
- One reader serves the process. A reload's new source continues where the old one stopped; no line is read twice. Hence at most one console source in the whole configuration, checked at validation.
- At the end of input the source ends, and with it a pipeline whose sources
have all ended; lw exits once every pipeline has
(CLI). Under a supervisor whose stdin is
/dev/nullthat is at once.
random
Generated entries, to check a deployment before real logs are wired: paths,
permissions, sinks, chains, and sanitizer policies with special = true.
[[pipelines.plugin_sources]]
id = "generator"
type = "random"
[pipelines.plugin_sources.config]
interval_ms = 500
jitter_ms = 0
format = "txt"
length = 20
special = false
Options, each as type and default:
interval_ms(int,500): emission period.jitter_ms(int,0): each interval varies by up to ±jitter_ms/2; non-negative, capped atinterval_ms.format(string,txt):raw(message only),txt(bracketed line) orjson(JSON object as the message).length(int,20): bytes of random text;txtandjsonwrap it in a longer message.special(bool,false): withlength≥ 3, mix in up to one control byte (\nand\ramong them) and a few non-ASCII bytes, often invalid UTF-8.rawandtxtcarry them as they are;jsonescapes them inside its message.
Levels (txt and json only) are random among DEBUG, INFO, WARN, ERROR.
null
Nothing; holds a source's place until one is chosen, so a pipeline can be set up, sinks first, before its source is.
[[pipelines.plugin_sources]]
id = "void"
type = "null"
No options.
tcp_chain
Listens for persistent NDJSON streams from upstream LogWisp tcp_chain sinks.
See Chaining for the protocol.
[[pipelines.plugin_sources]]
id = "ingest_tcp"
type = "tcp_chain"
[pipelines.plugin_sources.config]
host = "0.0.0.0"
port = 15801
buffer_size = 1000
max_connections = 0
read_timeout_ms = 0
hello_timeout_ms = 10000
trust_node = true
[pipelines.plugin_sources.config.tls]
enabled = true
cert_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/server.crt"
key_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/server.key"
client_auth = true
client_ca_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/client-ca.crt"
min_version = "1.3"
[pipelines.plugin_sources.config.auth]
type = "mtls"
allow = ["edge-01", "edge-02"]
node_binding = "force"
Options, each as type and default:
host(string,0.0.0.0): bind address, IPv4 or IPv6 (::); the listener keeps to its family (Networking).port(int, required): listen port, 1–65535.buffer_size(int,1000): subscriber channel depth.max_connections(int,0): concurrent connection cap;0= unlimited.read_timeout_ms(int,0): per-connection idle read deadline;0= none.hello_timeout_ms(int,10000): deadline for the hello preamble.trust_node(bool,true):falseoverrides the sender's node label with its remote address.auth.node_bindingassertorforcetakes over the connection label, andforcethe per-entry labels too (Chaining).tls(table): listener TLS; see Security.auth(table): peer authentication (mtlsorscram) and node binding; see Security.acl(table):allowanddeny, addresses or CIDRs admitted and refused before TLS,proxy_protocolwithproxy_fromfor the client a PROXY header names, andmax_connections_per_client; see Security.
For passwords instead of certificates, the auth block takes type = "scram"
and a credentials_file, or one username with its password_file, and
client_auth becomes optional; see
Password Authentication.
Behaviour
- TLS handshakes run explicitly with a 10 s bound before the preamble is read,
after the
max_connectionsadmission check. - Under
mtlsthe certificate is checked before the hello is read, so an unauthorized peer never gets a preamble parsed on its behalf. Underscramthe hello opens the login: challenge, proof and final follow on the same connection, the whole exchange withinhello_timeout_ms, and the final is sent only once node binding agrees. A source withoutscramanswers a hello offering credentials withauthentication not enabled. - An auth or node-binding refusal is logged at WARN and counted in
rejected_conns. A missing, malformed or wrong-version hello is logged at WARN (Rejected chain connection) and not counted inrejected_conns; underscrama malformed or wrong-version one counts inauth_rejected. A connection overmax_connectionsis closed and counted without a log. - The node label is then resolved by
trust_nodeandauth.node_binding(see Chaining). - Each accepted connection gets a session recording its remote address and:
node, the resolved label- under TLS:
tls,tls_peer_cn - under auth:
auth_method,auth_identity - behind a PROXY header: the proxy as
peer_addr
- A malformed entry line increments
parse_errorsand is skipped; the connection survives. A line over 1 MiB is a protocol violation and terminates the connection.
Statistics: host, port, tls, active_connections, rejected_conns,
parse_errors, tls_handshake_errors, trust_node, and the
auth and acl keys.
http_chain
Accepts NDJSON batches POSTed by upstream LogWisp http_chain sinks.
[[pipelines.plugin_sources]]
id = "ingest_http"
type = "http_chain"
[pipelines.plugin_sources.config]
host = "0.0.0.0"
port = 15802
ingest_path = "/ingest"
buffer_size = 1000
max_body_bytes = 8388608
read_timeout_ms = 30000
trust_node = true
[pipelines.plugin_sources.config.tls]
enabled = true
cert_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/server.crt"
key_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/server.key"
client_auth = true
client_ca_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/client-ca.crt"
[pipelines.plugin_sources.config.auth]
type = "mtls"
allow = ["edge-01", "edge-02"]
node_binding = "force"
Options, each as type and default:
host,port,trust_node,tls,auth: as on tcp_chain.ingest_path(string,/ingest): endpoint path; must start with/, and/authis reserved for the login.buffer_size(int,1000): subscriber channel depth.max_body_bytes(int,8388608): per-request body cap (8 MiB).read_timeout_ms(int,30000): full request read deadline.acl(table): as ontcp_chain, plusrequests_per_second_per_client.
Behaviour
- Only
POSTtoingest_pathand to/authis routed; other methods get405with anAllowheader, and other paths get404./authis the SCRAM login and answers404unlessauth.type = "scram". - Authorization runs before the body is read, so an unauthorized sender does not
get to stream
max_body_bytesinto the process. A missing, invalid or expired bearer token (scram) answers401, so the sender logs in again; a refused certificate, a certificate that does not match the token's user, and a node-binding failure answer403. Both are distinct from the400used for protocol errors, so a sender can tell "not allowed" from "malformed batch". - A missing or mismatched
X-Logwisp-Protocolheader is rejected with400. - With
acl.requests_per_second_per_client, a request over the rate gets429withRetry-After; the sink retries it. - Batch acceptance is atomic: entries are published only after the body reads
cleanly end to end. A transfer error, a line over 1 MiB included, rejects the
whole batch with
400, or413when the body cap is hit; anhttp_chainsink drops such a batch (dropped_batches) rather than retry it. A malformed line inside an otherwise clean transfer is skipped and counted inparse_errors. - Success is
204 No ContentwithX-Logwisp-Acceptedset to the number of entries ingested. - Sessions are cached per remote host + node + authenticated identity, and recreated after idle expiry. Including the identity in the key means two peers sharing a remote address never share a session.
Statistics: host, port, ingest_path, tls, total_requests,
rejected_requests, parse_errors, cached_sessions, trust_node, and the
auth and acl keys.
Source Statistics
Every source reports: id, type, total_entries, dropped_entries,
start_time, last_entry_time, and a type-specific details map. The DEBUG
status report spreads details into each plugin's line.
Network sources and sinks add the auth and acl keys to details:
auth: the method,nonewithout anauthblock; with one alsoauth_allowed,auth_rejected; chain sourcesnode_bindingmtls:auth_identity,auth_unrestrictedscramlisteners:auth_users,auth_throttled,auth_busy,auth_binding_mismatch,auth_identitywhen bound; on HTTPauth_token_lifetime_ms; in proxy modeauth_trusted_proxiesscramdialers:auth_username,auth_failures,last_auth_error
- with a non-empty
aclblock:acl,acl_denied,acl_limited,acl_proxy_headers