507 lines
22 KiB
Markdown
507 lines
22 KiB
Markdown
# Output Sinks
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Sinks consume `core.TransportEvent` values — a formatted `Payload` plus the
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original structured `Entry` — and deliver them somewhere. Each sink is declared
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as a `[[pipelines.plugin_sinks]]` entry with an `id`, a `type`, and a
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type-specific `config` table.
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Registered types: `console`, `file`, `http`, `tcp`, `null`, `tcp_chain`,
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`http_chain`.
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Dispatch into a sink is non-blocking. A sink whose input queue is full drops the
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event *for itself only* and the pipeline counts it in `total_dropped_by_sink`;
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sibling sinks are unaffected.
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---
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## console
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Writes formatted payloads to stdout or stderr. It is the sink of the built-in
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`pipe` pipeline, and of every spec pipeline given no `--sink`.
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```toml
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[[pipelines.plugin_sinks]]
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id = "stdout"
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type = "console"
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[pipelines.plugin_sinks.config]
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target = "stdout"
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buffer_size = 1000
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escape = "auto"
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color = "auto"
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```
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Options, each as type and default:
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- `target` (string, `stdout`): `stdout` or `stderr`.
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- `buffer_size` (int, `1000`): sink input queue depth.
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- `escape` (string, `auto`): write control characters as `<hex>` of their
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bytes, `ESC` as `<1b>`: `auto` when the output is a terminal, `always`, or
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`never`.
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- `color` (string, the top-level `color`, itself `auto`): paint level names:
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`auto` on a terminal with `NO_COLOR` unset and `TERM` not `dumb`, `always`,
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or `never`.
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> `split` is **not** a valid target for this sink and is rejected at startup.
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> Level-based splitting exists only for LogWisp's own application log
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> (`logging.output = "split"`).
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Payloads are written as the formatter made them, one record per line.
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- Escaping: a log line must not drive the terminal that shows it (cursor and
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screen control, title changes, OSC 52 clipboard writes, bidi spoofing). C0
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and C1 controls other than tab, DEL, the bidi controls, the line and
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paragraph separators and invalid UTF-8 are escaped; other invisible
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characters, such as the joiners emoji and Indic scripts need, are kept.
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`never` keeps an application's own ANSI colours; under `auto`, pipes and
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files get the bytes unchanged.
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- Color: the first whole word in a line, in any case, that names the entry's
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level is painted: `DEBUG`/`DBG` cyan (blue is hard to read on black),
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`INFO`/`INF` green, `WARNING`/`WARN` yellow, `ERROR`/`ERR`/`FATAL` bold red,
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`TRACE` grey. The colors are ANSI 16, so the terminal's theme picks the
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shades and a Linux or BSD text console renders them; the codes are the
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sink's own, written after escaping. A line whose source found no level
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stays plain. The codes go into whatever the format makes, JSON included:
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for output another program parses keep `auto` or `never`, not `always`.
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- Backpressure: the sink never drops. When its output is slow (a slow reader,
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a paused terminal, a stalled log collector) the pipeline waits for it, with
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its other sinks. A service whose stdout may stall writes to a `file` sink
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instead. A closed stdout pipe ends lw with `SIGPIPE`, as it ends `cat`.
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- On stop it writes what is queued.
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---
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## file
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Rotating file writer.
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```toml
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[[pipelines.plugin_sinks]]
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id = "archive"
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type = "file"
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[pipelines.plugin_sinks.config]
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directory = "/var/log/logwisp"
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name = "output"
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max_size_mb = 100
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max_total_size_mb = 1000
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min_disk_free_mb = 0
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retention_hours = 168.0
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buffer_size = 1000
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flush_interval_ms = 100
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```
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Options, each as type and default:
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- `directory` (string, **required**): output directory.
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- `name` (string, **required**): base filename.
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- `max_size_mb` (int, `100`): rotate when the active file reaches this size.
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- `max_total_size_mb` (int, `1000`): cap across all rotated files.
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- `min_disk_free_mb` (int, `0`): free-space floor before writing; `0` = none.
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- `retention_hours` (float, `168.0`): delete rotated files older than this.
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- `buffer_size` (int, `1000`): sink input queue depth, and the depth of the
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internal writer's queue, which drops and counts when full.
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- `flush_interval_ms` (int, `100`): forced flush interval.
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> `min_disk_free_mb` has an unusual default. The constructor replaces only
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> *negative* values with `100`; leaving the key unset yields `0`, which means no
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> free-space floor. Set it explicitly if you want one.
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The sink drives an internal writer configured for raw output with timestamps and
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levels disabled, so what lands on disk is exactly the formatted payload. On stop
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it hands the writer what is queued before closing the file.
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---
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## null
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Discards everything, counting entries and bytes. Useful for benchmarking a
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source or flow in isolation.
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```toml
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[[pipelines.plugin_sinks]]
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id = "discard"
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type = "null"
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```
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No options. The input queue is fixed at 1000.
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---
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## http
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Server-Sent Events stream, a JSON status endpoint, and a browser viewer.
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```toml
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[[pipelines.plugin_sinks]]
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id = "sse"
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type = "http"
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[pipelines.plugin_sinks.config]
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host = "0.0.0.0"
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port = 8080
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stream_path = "/stream"
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status_path = "/status"
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buffer_size = 1000
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client_buffer_size = 256
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write_timeout_ms = 0
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max_connections = 0
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[pipelines.plugin_sinks.config.tls]
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enabled = true
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cert_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/server.crt"
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key_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/server.key"
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client_auth = true
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client_ca_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/client-ca.crt"
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[pipelines.plugin_sinks.config.auth]
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type = "mtls"
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allow = ["viewer-01"]
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```
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Options, each as type and default:
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- `host` (string, `0.0.0.0`): bind address, IPv4 or IPv6 (`::`); the listener
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keeps to its family ([Networking](networking.md#address-family)).
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- `port` (int, **required**): listen port.
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- `stream_path` (string, `/stream`): SSE endpoint, matched exactly (`/logs/`
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does not answer `/logs/x`); it starts with `/`, is clean (no `//`, `.` or
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`..` segment) and holds none of `{`, `}`, `%`, `?`, `#`.
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- `status_path` (string, `/status`): status endpoint, under the same rules;
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differs from `stream_path`.
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- `buffer_size` (int, `1000`): sink input queue depth.
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- `client_buffer_size` (int, `256`): per-client send queue depth.
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- `write_timeout_ms` (int, `0`): per-event write deadline; `0` = none.
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- `max_connections` (int, `0`): concurrent stream cap; `0` = unlimited.
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- `login_page` (bool, `false`): `scram` in proxy mode only (an error
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elsewhere): the browser login page at `/auth/login`.
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- `viewer_page` (bool, `false`): `scram` in proxy mode only (an error
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elsewhere): the live viewer at `/auth/view`; needs `login_page`. Without
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auth, or under `mtls`, the viewer is always served.
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- `tls` (table): listener TLS; see [Security](security.md).
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- `auth` (table): client authentication (`mtls` or `scram`); see
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[Security](security.md#the-auth-block).
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- `acl` (table): `allow` and `deny`, addresses or CIDRs admitted and refused
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before TLS, and `proxy_protocol` with `proxy_from` for the client a PROXY
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header names; see [Security](security.md#the-acl-block).
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**Behaviour**
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- Only `GET` is routed to either path; anything else gets `405`, `HEAD` on
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`stream_path` included — a stream is a body, and a client registered to have
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its body discarded never reads and never leaves.
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- With an `auth` block, one middleware gates **both** endpoints, with no body
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detail in a refusal. Under `mtls` a refused certificate gets `403`. Under
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`scram` a client logs in at `POST /auth`, which sits outside the gate (see
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[`lw auth token`](cli.md#lw-auth)), and sends
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`Authorization: Bearer <token>`; a missing, invalid or expired token gets
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`401` with `WWW-Authenticate`, a certificate that does not match the token's
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user `403`. A stream is checked when it connects and outlives its token; a
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reload ends it. `/auth` and every path under it are reserved.
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- With `auth.trusted_proxies` (proxy mode) the sink sits behind a site's
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TLS-terminating reverse proxy: only the proxies may connect, browsers log in
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through `/auth/login` or the site's own copy of `/auth/scram.js`, and stream
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and status also accept the `logwisp_session` cookie. See
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[Browsers behind a TLS-terminating proxy](security.md#browsers-behind-a-tls-terminating-proxy).
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- `GET /` answers `303` to `auth/view`, a relative `Location` that a proxy
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prefix keeps, wherever a browser can read the stream:
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- without auth, over plain http too: the viewer needs no secure context, so
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`http://ADDRESS:PORT/` works;
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- under `mtls`, with the browser's client certificate (`openssl pkcs12
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-export -in NAME.crt -inkey NAME.key -out NAME.p12` imports it);
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- in proxy mode with `viewer_page`, or to `auth/login` with `login_page`
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alone;
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- never under `scram` on the sink's own TLS, which a browser cannot log in
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to: `/` is refused like any other path;
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- an endpoint at `/` keeps the root, and the viewer stays at `/auth/view`.
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The viewer shows entries from when it connects (the sink keeps no backlog)
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and holds one stream against `max_connections`.
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- Refusals are logged at WARN and counted in `auth_rejected`. The authorized
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identity is recorded in the client's session as `auth_method` /
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`auth_identity`.
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- On connect the client receives an `event: connected` frame carrying its
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client id, session id, sink instance id, endpoint paths, and buffer size.
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- Payloads are framed per the SSE spec, one `data:` line per line break in the
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payload (CRLF, LF or a lone CR), so multi-line entries stream correctly and
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no entry can inject an `event:`, `id:` or `retry:` field.
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- The server sets no `WriteTimeout` (that would kill long-lived streams);
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per-write deadlines come from `write_timeout_ms` via `http.ResponseController`
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and cover the connected frame, every payload, and the idle comment.
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- A quiet stream emits an SSE comment every 15 s. It refreshes the client's
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session and is how a peer that stopped reading is noticed.
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- A client whose send queue is full has that event dropped
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(`dropped_writes`); it is not disconnected. A `dropped_writes` that rises while
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no client is behind is a burst larger than `client_buffer_size`, not
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backpressure: size the queue at or above whatever burst the pipeline's
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`rate_limit` releases at once.
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- A client is registered only once its connected frame has flushed, so the
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broker never queues into a buffer whose reader has not started.
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- Clients whose session has been idle-expired by the session manager are
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evicted by the broker. With the idle comment above, that reaches only a peer
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that has stopped accepting bytes on a sink configured `write_timeout_ms = 0`.
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- On shutdown (a reload too), each stream writes its queue and what remains
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of the sink's input, then
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`event: disconnect / data: {"reason":"server_shutdown"}`, on its own and
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within `write_timeout_ms`, at most 2 s; a client still behind is cut then,
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and one that stopped reading costs the others nothing.
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- HTTP/2 is negotiated via ALPN when TLS is enabled; plaintext is HTTP/1.1.
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**Status endpoint** returns service and version identity, host, port, TLS flag,
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the compiled auth policy and acl, active client count, sink and per-client
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buffer sizes, connection limit, write timeout, uptime, endpoint paths, and the
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`total_processed` / `dropped_writes` / `rejected_clients` / `auth_rejected` /
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`acl_denied` counters.
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**Statistics**: `dropped_writes`, `rejected_clients`, `auth`, `auth_allowed`,
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`auth_rejected`; under `scram` also `auth_users`, `auth_throttled`,
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`auth_busy`, `auth_binding_mismatch` and `auth_token_lifetime_ms`, and in
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proxy mode `auth_trusted_proxies`; with `acl` rules or `proxy_from` also
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`acl`, `acl_denied` and `acl_proxy_headers`.
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> Without an `auth` block both endpoints are unauthenticated, and the stream
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> response carries `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`, so any web origin can read
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> it. With one, the header is omitted. Set an `auth` block, bind to a trusted
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> interface, or put an authenticating reverse proxy in front.
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---
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## tcp
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Broadcasts formatted payloads to every connected TCP client.
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```toml
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[[pipelines.plugin_sinks]]
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id = "tap"
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type = "tcp"
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[pipelines.plugin_sinks.config]
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host = "0.0.0.0"
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port = 9090
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buffer_size = 1000
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client_buffer_size = 256
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write_timeout_ms = 5000
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keep_alive = true
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keep_alive_period_ms = 30000
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max_connections = 0
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[pipelines.plugin_sinks.config.tls]
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enabled = true
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cert_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/server.crt"
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key_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/server.key"
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client_auth = true
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client_ca_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/client-ca.crt"
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[pipelines.plugin_sinks.config.auth]
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type = "mtls"
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allow = ["viewer-01"]
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```
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Options, each as type and default:
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- `host` (string, `0.0.0.0`): bind address, IPv4 or IPv6 (`::`); the listener
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keeps to its family ([Networking](networking.md#address-family)).
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- `port` (int, **required**): listen port.
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- `buffer_size` (int, `1000`): sink input queue depth.
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- `client_buffer_size` (int, `256`): per-client send queue depth.
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- `write_timeout_ms` (int, `5000`): per-write deadline.
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- `keep_alive` (bool, `true`): TCP keep-alive on accepted connections.
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- `keep_alive_period_ms` (int, `30000`): keep-alive idle period.
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- `max_connections` (int, `0`): concurrent connection cap; `0` = unlimited.
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- `tls` (table): listener TLS.
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- `auth` (table): client authentication (`mtls` or `scram`); see
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[Security](security.md#the-auth-block).
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- `acl` (table): `allow` and `deny`, addresses or CIDRs admitted and refused
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before TLS, and `proxy_protocol` with `proxy_from` for the client a PROXY
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header names; see [Security](security.md#the-acl-block).
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**Behaviour**
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- The sink is write-only. Each connection also runs a reader that discards
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inbound bytes; it exists to detect disconnects and to refresh session
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activity when a client sends anything. Under `scram` the client must log in
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first: a hello carrying the login, then challenge, proof and final, all
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within 10 s, after which the stream follows on the same connection. `nc` and
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`openssl s_client` cannot do this; use
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[`lw auth stream`](cli.md#lw-auth).
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- A write that misses its deadline means the kernel buffer stayed full for the
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whole timeout, so the client is disconnected immediately rather than retried.
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- A client whose send queue is full has that event dropped (`dropped_writes`)
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and stays connected.
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- On shutdown, as with the `http` sink, each client receives what is queued,
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within `write_timeout_ms`, at most 2 s, before it is disconnected.
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- With TLS enabled the handshake runs under a 10 s bound *after* the
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`max_connections` check, so concurrent handshakes are bounded too.
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- With an `auth` block, authorization runs after that handshake and *before*
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registration, so an unauthorized client never enters the client map and never
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receives a broadcast. Its connection is closed, the rejection logged at WARN,
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and `rejected_conns` incremented.
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**Statistics**: `write_errors`, `dropped_writes`, `rejected_conns`,
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`tls_handshake_errors`, `auth`, `auth_allowed`, `auth_rejected`; under `scram`
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also `auth_users`, `auth_throttled`, `auth_busy` and `auth_binding_mismatch`;
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with `acl` rules or `proxy_from` also `acl`, `acl_denied` and
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`acl_proxy_headers`.
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---
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## tcp_chain
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Forwards structured entries to a downstream LogWisp `tcp_chain` source over one
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persistent connection. See [Chaining](chaining.md).
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```toml
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[[pipelines.plugin_sinks]]
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id = "to_relay"
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type = "tcp_chain"
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[pipelines.plugin_sinks.config]
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host = "relay.internal"
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port = 15801
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node = "edge-01"
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buffer_size = 1000
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dial_timeout_ms = 5000
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write_timeout_ms = 5000
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backoff_min_ms = 500
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backoff_max_ms = 30000
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keep_alive = true
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keep_alive_period_ms = 30000
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[pipelines.plugin_sinks.config.tls]
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enabled = true
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ca_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/ca.crt"
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cert_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/client.crt"
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key_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/client.key"
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```
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Options, each as type and default:
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- `host` (string, **required**): downstream host or address; an IPv6 one goes
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bare (`::1`).
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- `port` (int, **required**): downstream port.
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- `node` (string, `os.Hostname()`): origin label stamped on first-hop entries.
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- `buffer_size` (int, `1000`): sink input queue depth.
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- `dial_timeout_ms` (int, `5000`): TCP connect timeout.
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- `write_timeout_ms` (int, `5000`): per-write deadline.
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- `backoff_min_ms` (int, `500`): reconnect backoff floor.
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- `backoff_max_ms` (int, `30000`): reconnect backoff ceiling.
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- `keep_alive` (bool, `true`): TCP keep-alive.
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- `keep_alive_period_ms` (int, `30000`): keep-alive idle period.
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- `tls` (table): dialer TLS; `cert_file`/`key_file` present a client identity.
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- `auth` (table): server identity pinning (`mtls`) or a login (`scram`); see
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[Security](security.md#the-auth-block).
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**Behaviour**
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- The connection is established lazily, so pipeline start does not depend on the
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downstream being up.
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- Under `scram` the hello carries the login, and the link counts as established
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only once the server's final message proves it holds the user's verifier. The
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exchange is bounded at 10 s and cut short by shutdown. A refusal —
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`authentication failed`, `authentication not enabled`, `no challenge within
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10s` — is logged at WARN as `Chain connect refused` on every attempt; other
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connect failures log at DEBUG. Both retry under the normal backoff.
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- Each entry is serialized as one canonical JSON line. Delivery holds the line
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across reconnects until it is written or the process shuts down, with
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exponential backoff plus ±20 % jitter between attempts. The delay keeps
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growing until a link outlives `backoff_min_ms`, so a source that drops every
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link right after accepting it is not retried in a tight loop.
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- On shutdown (a reload too) the sink delivers what is queued, connecting
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first if it must, within `write_timeout_ms`, at most 2 s; then the link
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closes and what is left is lost.
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- A source never writes once a link is up, so the sink watches each link: a
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line from the source is a refusal (a sink without `scram` facing a `scram`
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source), logged at WARN as `Chain link refused`; EOF ends the link at once
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instead of at the next failed write.
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- Because delivery blocks the sink's run loop during an outage, back-pressure
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surfaces as a full input queue and is counted by the pipeline as
|
|
`total_dropped_by_sink`.
|
|
- With TLS, dial and handshake are bounded together by
|
|
`dial_timeout_ms` + 10 s.
|
|
- Events arriving without a structured entry are wrapped from the formatted
|
|
payload and counted in `synthesized`.
|
|
|
|
Under `mtls` the policy pins the server's identity as part of the handshake, so
|
|
a server it rejects is refused like a failed login above.
|
|
|
|
**Statistics**: `target`, `node`, `tls`, `auth`, `connected`, `reconnects`,
|
|
`write_errors`, `synthesized`; under `scram` also `auth_username`,
|
|
`auth_failures` and `last_auth_error` (empty after a successful login).
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
## http_chain
|
|
|
|
Batches structured entries as NDJSON and POSTs them to a downstream LogWisp
|
|
`http_chain` source.
|
|
|
|
```toml
|
|
[[pipelines.plugin_sinks]]
|
|
id = "to_collector"
|
|
type = "http_chain"
|
|
[pipelines.plugin_sinks.config]
|
|
host = "collector.internal"
|
|
port = 15802
|
|
ingest_path = "/ingest"
|
|
node = "edge-01"
|
|
buffer_size = 1000
|
|
max_batch_count = 100
|
|
max_batch_bytes = 1048576
|
|
flush_interval_ms = 1000
|
|
request_timeout_ms = 10000
|
|
backoff_min_ms = 500
|
|
backoff_max_ms = 30000
|
|
|
|
[pipelines.plugin_sinks.config.tls]
|
|
enabled = true
|
|
ca_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/ca.crt"
|
|
cert_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/client.crt"
|
|
key_file = "/etc/logwisp/tls/client.key"
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
Options, each as type and default:
|
|
|
|
- `host` (string, **required**): downstream host or address; an IPv6 one goes
|
|
bare (`::1`).
|
|
- `port` (int, **required**): downstream port.
|
|
- `ingest_path` (string, `/ingest`): endpoint path; must start with `/`.
|
|
- `node` (string, `os.Hostname()`): origin label stamped on first-hop entries.
|
|
- `buffer_size` (int, `1000`): sink input queue depth.
|
|
- `max_batch_count` (int, `100`): flush after this many entries.
|
|
- `max_batch_bytes` (int, `1048576`): flush after this many bytes (1 MiB).
|
|
- `flush_interval_ms` (int, `1000`): flush after this long.
|
|
- `request_timeout_ms` (int, `10000`): covers dial, write, and response.
|
|
- `backoff_min_ms` (int, `500`): retry backoff floor.
|
|
- `backoff_max_ms` (int, `30000`): retry backoff ceiling.
|
|
- `tls` (table): dialer TLS; `cert_file`/`key_file` present a client identity.
|
|
- `auth` (table): server identity pinning (`mtls`) or a login (`scram`); see
|
|
[Security](security.md#the-auth-block).
|
|
|
|
**Behaviour**
|
|
|
|
- Delivery is at-least-once per batch: a retried batch can be delivered twice if
|
|
the first attempt succeeded but the response was lost.
|
|
- Retries apply to transport errors, `408`, `429`, and `5xx`. Any other
|
|
non-2xx response is treated as permanent, and the batch is dropped and counted
|
|
in `dropped_batches`. A retry is logged at WARN, a dropped batch at ERROR.
|
|
- Under `scram` the sink logs in at `POST /auth` whenever it holds no token and
|
|
sends `Authorization: Bearer <token>`. A failed login is retried like a
|
|
transport error, holding the batch. The token is renewed ahead of its expiry;
|
|
a `401` on ingest (the source reloaded) drops it and the retry logs in again.
|
|
A `403` is permanent. A connection presenting a certificate other than the
|
|
one the login was bound to drops token and pin, and the retry logs in anew.
|
|
A sink without `scram` facing a `scram` source gets `401` and drops every
|
|
batch.
|
|
- Redirects are never followed; a `3xx` is permanent too. Following one would
|
|
resend the batch wherever the response points, plaintext `http` included.
|
|
- HTTP/2 is off by design; batched NDJSON POSTs gain nothing from it.
|
|
- On shutdown (a reload too) the sink delivers what is queued and batched
|
|
within `request_timeout_ms`, at most 2 s; each batch still undelivered then
|
|
is dropped and logged at WARN.
|
|
|
|
**Statistics**: `target`, `node`, `tls`, `auth`, `batches_sent`,
|
|
`request_errors`, `dropped_batches`, `synthesized`; under `scram` also
|
|
`auth_username`, `auth_failures` and `last_auth_error`.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
## Sink Statistics
|
|
|
|
Every sink reports: `id`, `type`, `total_processed`, `active_connections`,
|
|
`start_time`, `last_processed`, and a type-specific `details` map. The DEBUG
|
|
status report spreads `details` into each plugin's line.
|